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I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, some recent developments in the law relating to prejudg-
ment relief will be traced. The focus of the discussion will be certain pro-
posals of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee' and the rise and the
development of the Mareva2 injunction. Although creditors in Ontario may
also obtain prejudgment relief under such statutes as the Absconding Debtors
Act,$ the Small Claims Courts Act4 and the Fraudulent Debtors Arrest Act,6
this legislation will not be discussed in this paper. This legislation is recog-
nized to be of limited utility to the creditor who is concerned about the
activities of his debtor before judgment. Additionally these statutes, which
have remained unchanged for a century, are under review by the Ontario
Law Reform Commission (OLRC) at the present time.0 An appraisal of the
Commission's recommendations in this regard must await the publication of
Part IV of the Report on the Enforcement of Judgment Debts and Related
Matters.7
T he Civil Procedure Revision Committee was established in 1975 under
the auspices of the Ministry of the Attorney General, Province of Ontario.8
Its terms of reference were as follows:
(1) A thorough re-examination of the principles and policies upon which the Rules
of Practice are based and an evaluation of individual rules with a view to:
(a) simplifying as much as possible, the procedure in civil actions concen-
trating on the use of simple language and terminology;
(b) decreasing the number of rules;
(c) balancing the expense to litigants of the prescribed procedures against
convenience, efficiency and social purpose;
(d) consideration of alternative, more expeditious and less formal adjudica-
tive procedures; and
(e) developing innovative measures to ensure that the procedure in civil liti-
gation is understandable by members of the public, the steps necessary
to finalize a dispute are minimal and the cost of such procedure is rea-
sonable.
(2) In conjunction with the review of the Rules of Practice, a complete examina-
tion of The Judicature Act and other statutes affected by proposed changes
in the rules.
(3) Consideration of the nature and function of the Rules Committee under The
I See Ont., Civil Procedure Revision Committee (Toronto: Min. of A.G., 1980)
[hereinafter Report].
2 See Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. Int'l Bulkcarriers SA (The Mareva), [19801
1 All E.R. 213, [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509 (C.A.).
a R.S.O. 1980, c. 2.
4 R.S.O. 1980, c. 476, ss. 159-73, the absconding debtors provisions of the Small
Claims Courts Act.
5 R.S.O. 1980, c. 177.
6See O.L.R.C., Fourteenth Annual Report 1980-81 (Toronto, 1981).
7 O.L.R.C., Report on the Enforcement of Judgment Debts and Related Matters
(Toronto: Min. of A.G., 1981). Parts I-HI of this report were published in 1981.
8 For a history of the Committee, see Williston, Revising the Ontario Rules of
Practice-The Work of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee (1977-78), 1 Adv. Q.
18.
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Judicature Act to determine an appropriate method for continuous review of
the rules subsequent to the current proposed revision.9
In June 1980, the Committee issued its Report10 containing a proposed re-
vision of the Judicature Act" and proposed Rules of Civil Procedure. 12
Among the matters considered by the Committee were five important pre-
judgment remedies, each of which is discussed briefly in Part II of this paper.
Shortly after the creation of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee,
the English courts recognized the need for a prejudgment remedy to prevent
a debtor from removing his assets from England pending the final determina-
tion of proceedings commenced against the debtor by his creditor.' 3 Despite
long standing authority to the contrary,' 4 the English Court of Appeal, in a
series of decisions in 1975,15 concluded that, before he has secured a judg-
ment against his debtor, a creditor should be able to enjoin him in certain
circumstances from dealing with his assets to the creditor's detriment. The
rise and development of this type of an injunction, known as a Mareva in-
junction,:' will be examined in Part III of this paper. In Part IV, attention
will be focused on recent judicial pronouncements respecting the Mareva
injunction in Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
The final section of this paper will contrast briefly the approach taken
by the Civil Procedure Revision Committee in respect of the five prejudg-
ment remedies considered in Part II and the judicial creation of the Mareva
injunction. Of particular interest is the fact that the Mareva injunction de-
velopments span the period during which the Civil Procedure Revision Com-
mittee deliberated the changes to be made to Ontario's present Judicature
Act and the existing Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice.
9 Report, supra note 1, s. 1, at 2.
10 Supra note 1.
11 Id., s. 5. The proposed Act would replace the existing Judicature Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 223.
12 Id., s. 6. The Rules of Civil Procedure would take the place of the present
Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice, R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 540.
13 The first case in which an English court granted such relief was Nippon Yusen
Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093, [1975] 3 All E.R. 282, [1975] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 137 (C.A.). For a discussion of this case, see discussion in Part II, section A,
infra.
14 See e.g., Lister & Co. v. Stubbs (1890), 45 Ch. D. 1, 63 L.R. 75, 38 W.R. 548
(C.A.).
15 See discussion in Part II, s. A, infra.
16 The name is taken from the second of a trilogy of cases in which the English
Court of Appeal sanctioned the granting of such relief: see The Mareva, supra note 2.
See also Powles, The Mareva Injunction, [1978] J. of Bus. L. 11; Christie, The Mareva
Injunction: Preserving the Fruits of Success (1980), 1 B.L.R. 155; Grant, The Mareva
Injunction Four Years On (1980), 130 New L.J. 985; Jones, "The Rise of the 'Mareva'
Injunction," in Cambridge Lectures, Mendes da Costa, ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1981) 30; Jones, The Rise of the Mareva Injunction (1980), 11 U. Queensland L.J.
133; Cato, The Mareva Injunction and its Application in New Zealand, [1980] N.Z. LJ.
270, Stockwood, 'Mareva' Injunctions (1981), 3 Adv. Q. 85; Rose, The Mareva Injunc-
tion-attachment in personam-Part 1, [1981] L.M.C.L.Q. 1; Rose, The Mareva In-
junction-attachment in personam-Part 2, [1981] L.M.C.L.Q. 177.
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II. THE CIVIL PROCEDURE REVISION COMMITTEE AND
PREJUDGMENT RELIEF
In this Part of the paper, it is proposed to examine the treatment
accorded prejudgment relief in the Judicature Act 1'7 and Rules of Civil
Procedure 8 advocated by the Civil Procedure Revision Committee. The
focus will be on the following prejudgment remedies: a certificate of pending
litigation; an order for the preservation of property; an order for the interim
recovery of personal property; an order for the setting aside of a default judg-
ment upon terms; and an order for security for costs. Discussion of the use of
an interlocutory injunction restraining a debtor from disposing of, or transfer-
ring, any of his assets will be reserved until the final section of this paper.
A. Certificate of Pending Litigation
Section 50 of the proposed Judicature Act would replace sections 41
and 42 of the present Judicature Act.19 For purposes of convenience, sec-
tions 41 and 42 of the present Act, and section 50 of the recommended
replacement legislation, are set out in full. Sections 41 and 42 read as
follows:
41.-(1) The institution of an action or the taking of a proceeding in which
any title to or interest in land is brought in question shall not be deemed notice
of the action or proceeding to any person not a party to it until, where the land is
registered under The Land Titles Act, a caution is registered under that Act, or
in other cases, until a certificate, signed by the proper officer of the court, has
been registered in the registry office of the registry division in which the land is
situate.
(2) The certificate may be in the following form:
I Certify that in an action or proceeding in the Supreme Court of Ontario
between A .B., of .................................. and C.D ., of .................................
some title or interest is called in question in the following land:
(desdribing it).
Date at (stating place and date)
(3) Subsection 1 does not apply to an action or proceeding for foreclosure
or sale upon a registered mortgage or to enforce a lien under The Mechanics'
Lien Act.
(4) Any person who registers a certificate or caution referred to in subsec-
tion 1 without a reasonable claim to title to or interest in the land is liable for
any damages sustained by any person as a result of its registration.
(5) The liability for damages under subsection 4 and the amount thereof
may be determined in an action commenced therefor in the court in which the
certificate is issued or by application in the proceeding for an order to vacate the
caution or certificate or in the action or proceeding in which the question of title
to or interest in the land is determined.
42.-(1) Where a caution or certificate has been registered and the plaintiff
or other party at whose instance it was issued does not in good faith prosecute
the action or proceeding, a judge of the court in which the action or proceeding
was commenced may at any time make an order vacating the caution or certifi-
cate.
(2) Where a caution or certificate has been registered and the plaintiff's
claim is not solely to recover land or an estate or interest in land but to recover
17 Report, supra note 1, s. 5.
18 The proposed Rules of Civil Procedure would constitute schedule "A" of the
proposed Judicature Act: see id., s. 6.
'9 R.S.O. 1980, c. 223, as am.
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money or money's worth, chargeable on or payable out of land, or some estate or
interest in it, or for the payment of which he claims that the land or such estate
or interest ought to be subjected, or where the plaintiff claims land or some es-
tate or interest in land, and, in the alternative, damages or compensation in
money or money's worth, a judge of the court in which the action or proceeding
was commenced may at any time make an order vacating the caution or certificate
upon such terms as to giving security or otherwise as is considered just.
(3) A judge of the court in which the action or proceeding was commenced
may at any time vacate the registration upon any other ground that is considered
just.
(4) On an application under this section, the judge may order any of the
parties to it to pay the costs of any of the other parties to it, or may make any
other order with respect to costs that under all the circumstances is considered just.
(5) The order vacating a caution or certificate is subject to appeal according
to the practice in like cases and may be registered in the same manner as a
judgment affecting land, except that the judge granting the order may order a
stay of the registration for the purposes of the appeal.
(6) Where a caution or certificate is vacated, any person may deal in respect
to the land as fully as if the caution or certificate had not been registered, and
it is not incumbent on any purchaser or mortgagee to inquire as to the allegations
in the action or proceeding, and his rights are not affected by his being aware of
such allegations.
(7) The jurisdiction of a judge of the High Court under this section and
section 41 may be exercised by a local judge of the High Court.
Section 50 of the proposed Act states:
50.-(1) The commencement of a proceeding in which any title to or interest
in land is brought in question shall not be deemed notice of the proceeding to
any person not a party to it until, where the land is registered under The Land
Titles Act, a caution is registered under that Act, or in other cases, until a certi-
ficate, signed by the registrar of the court, has been registered in the registry
office of the registry division in which the land is situate.
(2) The certificate may be in the following form:
1 certify that in a proceeding in the .................... Court of ....................
between A.B., of .................... and C.D., of .................... some title or
interest is called in question in the following land: (describing it).
D ated at ................................ this ........ day of ....................... 19 ......
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to an action or proceeding for fore-
closure or sale upon a registered mortgage or charge, or to enforce a lien
under The Mechanics' Lien Act.
(4) Any party who registers a certificate or caution referred to in subsec-
tion (I) without a reasonable claim to title to or interest in the land is liable
for any damages sustained by any person as a result of its registration.
(5) The liability for damages under subsection (4) and the amount thereof
may be claimed in the same proceeding or in a separate proceeding.
(6) Where a caution or certificate has been registered and the plaintiff or
applicant, at whose instance it was issued, does not in good faith prosecute the
proceeding, the court in which the proceeding was commenced may at any time
make an order vacating the caution or certificate.
(7) Where a caution or certificate has been registered and the claim of the
plaintiff or applicant is not solely to recover any title to or interest in land but
to recover money chargeable on or payable out of land, or some interest in it,
or for the payment of which he claims that the land or such interest ought to
be subjected, or where the plaintiff or applicant claims any title to or interest
in land, and in the alternative, damages or compensation in money, the court
in which the proceeding was commenced may at any time make an order vacat-
ing the caution or certificate upon such terms as to giving security or otherwise
as may seem just.
(8) The court in which the proceeding was commenced may at any time
vacate the registration upon such other ground as may seem just.
(9) On a motion under this section, the court may order any of the parties
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to the proceeding to pay the costs of any of the other parties thereto, or may
make any other order with respect to costs that under all the circumstances may
seem just.
(10) The order vacating a caution or certificate is subject to appeal, and
the order may be registered in the same manner as a judgment affecting land,
but the court granting the order may order a stay of the registration pending
the disposition of the appeal.
(11) Where a caution or certificate is vacated, and the order vacating it
has been registered, any person may deal in respect to the land as fully as if
the caution or certificate had not been registered, and it is not incumbent on any
purchaser or mortgagee to inquire as to the allegations in the proceeding, and his
rights are not affected by his being aware of such allegations.
Essentially, the differences between the provisions to obtain a lis pendens
under the present Judicature Act and the equivalent section under the new
legislation are minimal. A certificate of pending litigation, like a lis pendens,
may be obtained only where the suit brings into question "any title to or
interest in land." Presumably, then, the existing jurisprudence regarding what
constitutes a "title to or interest in land" will be applicable to section 50 of
the new Act.20 The language of section 50(4) of the proposed Act puts
beyond doubt the freedom from liability of a party's lawyer for registering
a "certificate or caution.., without a reasonable claim to or interest in the
land." Section 41(4) of the present Act refers to the liability of "[a]ny
person," whereas section 50(4) of the proposed Judicature Act is stated in
terms of "any party." In this respect, the change in terminology seems to be
simply a codification of the case law, albeit sparse, in respect of section
41 (4).21
Another notable amendment to section 41 of the present Judicature
Act, proposed by the Committee, concerns the procedure for asserting a
claim for damages for the registration of a certificate or caution without
a reasonable claim to title to or interest in the land. While section 41 (5) of
the present Act enables such a claim to be asserted in three different ways,
section 50(5) of the proposed Act would require a claim to be asserted "in
the same proceeding or in a separate proceeding." In other words, under the
new Act liability could not be determined "by application in the proceeding
for an order to vacate the caution or certificate," a procedure permitted
under section 41(5) of the existing legislation.
Under the proposed Judicature Act, the issuing and the vacating of a
caution or certificate of pending litigation are outlined in the same provision,
section 50. The vacating of a lis pendens under the present Judicature Act,
2OFor a discussion of this point, see Williston and Rolls, 2 The Law of Civil
Procedure 2 Vols. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1970) at 599-607. For a collection of the
relevant cases, see 1 Holmested and Gale on the Judicature Act of Ontario and Rules
of Practice (Annotated) (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) at 443-50 (Rel. 15, Oct. 1980). See
also Rolls, Civil Procedure, [1967] L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 77 at 90; Collins-Williams,
The Recovery of Land, [1961] L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 29 at 46-53.
21 See e.g., McIntyre v. Commerce Capital Mortgage Corp. (1980), 28 O.R. (2d)
353, 110 D.L.R. (3d) 421 (H.C.). Section 41(4) was introduced in response to a
number of decisions in which it was held that a lis pendens cannot be treated as a
slander of title: See e.g., Greenwood v. Magee (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 685, 4 C.P.C. 67
(H.C.).
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on the other hand, is the exclusive concern of section 42. The provisions of
section 42 have been repeated, however, with some minor changes in lan-
guage in the proposed section 50.
The procedure to be followed to obtain a certificate of pending litigation
is dealt with in Rule 42 of the proposed Rules of Civil Procedure: "Where
a claim for a certificate... together with a description, sufficient for regis-
tration, of the lands in question, has been included in the originating process,
a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation may be made
without notice." 22 Notice of the motion for leave to issue such a certificate
must be given if the originating process is silent regarding a claim for a certi-
ficate of pending litigation.P Rule 32 of the existing Rules of Practice, on
the other hand, contains no procedure to obtain a lis pendens where it is not
claimed in the endorsement on the writ of summons. Presumably, the plain-
tiff would be required to amend the endorsement on his writ of summons
to include a claim for a lis pendens before a court could grant this prejudg-
ment relief. Assumng that the writ of summons contains a claim, in the
appropriate form, for a Iis pendens, Rule 32(2) provides that a "certificate
shall not issue without leave of the court, to be obtained upon an ex parte
application."
The present Judicature Act and Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of
Practice, and the proposed Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, do not obligate
the party, who obtains a certificate and registers it, to notify the landowner
of such registration.2 4 As a result, the landowner may be surprised and em-
barrassed to learn that his property is the subject of a claim. He may suffer
damages as a result; for example, a proposed sale, or other disposition, of
the land may be aborted because of the registration of a certificate or cau-
tion. Another important respect in which the existing provisions are deficient
is the failure to indicate the onus borne by an applicant. 25
2 2 Report, supra note 1, s. 6, Rule 42.02.
23 Id., Rule 42.03.
24 Compare the Court Order Enforcement Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 75, s. 81(1),
which requires a judgment creditor who has registered a judgment against the title to
land to give notice "to the owner against whose title the judgment has been registered."
25 There is some suggestion that a lis pendens will be granted only if a prima facie
right to any "title to or interest in land" is established: see Dileo v. Ginnell, [1968] 2
O.R. 32 (Master S.C.). This view must be questioned because of the attitude that the
courts have shown on applications to vacate a Us pendens: e.g., Inwood v. Ivey, [1939]
O.W.N. 56, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 101, where it was held that a lis pendens ought not to be
vacated unless it is shown that in no possible circumstances can the claim of the plain-
tiff, as endorsed on the writ, and as it may be developed in the pleadings, give any right
in the lands in question. In another case, it was held that a showing that there is a
triable issue between the parties as to an interest in land will support a lis pendens: see
Procopio v. D'Abbondanza, [1970] 1 O.R. 127 (C.A.). More recently, Steele J., in
Freedman v. Lawrence (1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 423, 82 D.L.R. (3d) 747, 6 C.P.C. 24
(H.C.), stated the test for the vacating of a Us pendens somewhat differently. In his
opinion, a court should vacate a Us pendens only where it is shown that the plaintiffs
action is an abuse of process or that the plaintiff cannot possibly succeed in obtaining
an interest in the land in question. Compare, however, the obiter dicta of Hollingworth
J., in Arnett v. Menke (1979), 11 C.P.C. 263 at 273 (Ont. H.C.), suggesting that, where
the equities are strongly weighted in favour of the defendant, the equities should prevail.
19811
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B. Order for Preservation of Property
Rule 372 of the existing Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice
enables a party to an action to obtain an "order for the detention or preser-
vation of property, being the subject of the action upon such terms as seem
just."26 In this context, reference should also be made to Rules 369, 370 and
371. Rule 369 empowers the court, where a dispute arises out of a contract,
to order the preservation or interim custody of property, the title to which
is in dispute. Rule 370 gives the court the general power to order the sale
of "any goods, wares or merchandise that may be of a perishable nature or
likely to be injured from keeping," or for any other reason supporting an
immediate sale. Rule 371 provides as follows:
371. Where a plaintiff seeks to recover specific property other than land,
and the defendant does not dispute the title of the plaintiff, but claims to retain
the property by virtue of a lien or otherwise as security for money, the court
may order that the plaintiff pay into court, to abide the event of the action, the
amount of money in respect of which the lien or security is claimed, and such
further sum, if any, for interest and costs as the court directs, and that, upon
such payment into court being made, the property claimed be given up to him.
The counterpart to these provisions in the proposed Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are Rules 35.02 to 35.04, which provide as follows:
35.02 The court may make an order for the custody, detention or preserva-
tion of any personal property in question in the action or relevant to any issue
in the action and, where any such property is of a perishable nature or likely
to deteriorate or for any other reason ought to be sold, the court may order
the sale thereof in such manner and upon such terms as to the court may seem
just.
35.03 Where the right of any party to a specific fund is in dispute, the
court may order the fund to be paid into court or otherwise secured on such
terms, if any, as to the court may seem just.
35.04 Where any party from whom the recovery of personal property is
claimed does not dispute the title of the party making the claim, but seeks to
retain the property as security for monies alleged to be owing to him, by virtue
of a lien or otherwise, the court may order the party claiming recovery of the
property to pay into court, or otherwise secure the monies alleged to be owing
and such further sum, if any, for interest and costs as the court may direct.
Upon compliance with the order, the property in question shall be delivered to
the party claiming recovery thereof and the monies in court or the security as
furnished shall abide the event of the action.
Under Rule 35.02, it is clear that preservation orders are available only
with respect to personal property. Further, the court is expressly authorized
to order the sale of property subject .to a preservation order where the prop-
erty is of a perishable nature or likely to deteriorate or for any other reason.
Finally, provision is made for the securing, by payment into court or other-
26 For a brief description of this remedy, see Grossberg, Recovery of a Chattel
(including Interim Preservation of Property and Replevin), [1961], L.S.U.C. Special
Lectures 65 at 71-72. See also Williston and Rolls, supra note 20, Vol. 2, at 967-70.
The prejudgment relief nature of this remedy was made abundantly clear by Jessel M.R.
in Polini v. Gray (1879), 12 Ch. D. (C.A.) 438 at 443, where he stated that the
underlying principle of the rule was "that the successful party in the litigation, that is,
the ultimately successful party, is to reap the fruits of that litigation, and not to obtain
merely a barren success."
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wise, of any specific fund the right to which is in dispute. Proposed Rule
35.03 differs substantially from the existing Rule 369. The Rules respecting
preservation orders are also deficient in a number of significant ways. For
example, Rules 35.02 to 35.04 are silent on the question whether a person
seeking a preservation order must give the opponent notice of the applica-
tion.27 Again, the Rules make no mention of the onus the claimant must
satisfy in order to be entitled to a preservation order.28 In other words, does
the claimant have to satisfy the court that the litigation will be successful;
or would proof of a prima facie case be satisfactory? 29 Alternatively, could
the claimant simply establish that the action commenced raises a viable
issue? Nor do the Rules in question give any indication of the kinds of cir-
cumstances that will support a court issuing a preservation of property or-
der.30 The gaps in these Rules raise serious issues of public policy.
C. Order for the Interim Recovery of Personal Property
The third prejudgment remedy, described briefly in this Part of the
paper, is an order for the interim recovery of personal property, governed
by section 51 of the proposed Judicature Act and Rule 44 of the proposed
Rules of Civil Procedure. The equivalent to an order for interim recovery
under the present law is an order for replevin. The Replevin Act31 outlines
the circumstances in which such relief is available, while the procedure to be
followed in securing an order for replevin is dealt with in Rules 359 to 368
of the Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice. The Committee was of
the view that, since replevin was a procedural matter, it should be governed
27 As a result of some very early cases, it would appear that the order may be
made on an ex parte application in appropriate circumstances: see Hennessey & Co. v.
Rohmann, Osborne & Co. (1877), 36 L.T. 51 (Ch.); Mitchell v. Darley Main Colliery
Co. (1883), 10 Q.B.D. 457, 31 W.R. 549, 52 LJ. Q.B. 394; and Meluish v. Milton
(1876), 3 Ch. D. 27, 24 W.R. 679, 35 L.T. 82 (C.A.). Ordinarily, however, it should
be made upon notice: Habershon v. Gill, [1875] W.N. 679, [1875] Bitt. Prac., Cas. 45,
1 Chap. Cham. Cas. 14.
2 8 For a recent case under Rule 46 of the B.C. Rules of Court, 1976 equivalent of
proposed Rule 35.02 and of Ontario's present Rule 372, see Nicoll v. Oakes (1979),
17 B.C.L.R. 356 at 363, 14 C.P.C. 144 at 152 (S.C.), where Fulton J. stated that:
... the question raised or to be raised, and in respect of which the protection of
the order is sought, must be one which is serious, which is going to require
determination by the court, and which arises or will arise between the applicant
and some person who is also before the court... or, if it is interlocutory, as a
result of some other process in which the persons involved are also parties.
29 See e.g., Douglas, Rogers Ltd. v. Henderson (1972), 5 N.S.R. (2d) 396, 28
D.L.R. (3d) 106 (S.C.T.D.), followed in Carl B. Potter v. Anil Canada Ltd. (1975),
65 D.L.R. (3d) 758 (N.S.S.C.T.D.).
39See Henderson, id. (possibility of the property "disappearing" before final ad-
judication; the possibility of the applicant suffering irreparable harm from the loss of
the property) and ,Socit6 Pour l'Administration du Droit de R~production Michanique
des Auteurs v. Trans World Record Corp., [1977] 2 F.C. 602, 17 N.R. 162 (Fed. C.A.)
(balance of convenience between the parties).
31 R.S.O. 1980, c. 449. For a discussion of this remedy, see Grossberg, supra note
26; Campbell, Declaratory Judgments and Interim Orders, [1979] L.S.U.C. Special
Lectures 157 at 173-75; Morris, Replevin (1980), 2 Adv. Q. 188.
1981]
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by the new Judicature Act and, therefore, that the Replevin Act should be
repealed.3 2 The Committee, however, did not recommend any substantial
change to the law of replevin.
Under what circumstances will an order for the interim recovery of
personal property be available once the recommendations of the Committee
have been made law? Section 51(1) of the proposed Judicature Act states
as follows:
51.-(1) In any action in which the recovery of personal property is claim-
ed, and it is alleged that the property was unlawfully taken from the possession
of the plaintiff, or is unlawfully detained by the defendant, the plaintiff may
apply to the court for an interim order for its recovery.
Undoubtedly, there is some overlap between this provision and the Rules
governing orders for the preservation of personal property. Yet, section 51
goes on to deal with a host of questions not covered by the proposed Rules
35.02 to 35.04. The defendant's right to claim damages, for example, is
prescribed by section 51(2), which provides as follows:
51.-(2) Where a plaintiff recovers possession of personal property, pursuant
to an interim order under subsection (1), but fails in his action, he is liable to
the defendant for any loss sustained by the defendant resulting from the interim
recovery of the property.
Section 51(3) outlines the right of a plaintiff in certain circumstances to
assert a claim for damages against the defendant.
51.-(3) Where the defendant recovers possession of the property by reason
of having the interim order obtained by the plaintiff set aside and the plaintiff
succeeds in his action, the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for any loss sus-
tained by the plaintiff resulting from the property having been returned to the
possession of the defendant.
One must ask why the Committee did not see a need for similar provisions
when property is "recovered" by means of a preservation order, rather than
by an order for the interim recovery of personal property? Certainly, the
risks for the parties appear to be similar, if not identical, where resort is had
to the prejudgment remedy of a preservation order. Perhaps even more sur-
prising than the failure of the Committee to include provisions equivalent
to section 51(2) and (3) in Rule 35 of the proposed Rules dealing with
preservation orders, is the fact that section 50 of the new Judicature Act,
concerned with certificates of pending litigation, contains no provision similar
to section 51(3). It will be recalled that section 50 authorizes the issuance
of a certificate of pending litigation where "any title to or interest in land is
brought in question by a proceeding." Section 50(4) makes "[amny party
who registers a certificate... without a reasonable claim to title to or interest
in the land.., liable for any damages sustained by any person as a result of
its registration." This subsection is similar to section 51 (2), described above.
Yet, even though a court is given power to vacate the registration of a certi-
ficate of pending litigation, just as a court may rescind an order for the
32 Letter from W.B. Williston Q.C. to the Hon. R.R. McMurtry in Report, supra
note 1, s. 1, at 13.
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interim recovery of personal property, section 50 contains no provision per-
mitting the plaintiff to assert a claim for damages against the defendant.
This statutory variance would seem to be inexplicable.
Compare also sections 50(5) and 51(4) of the proposed Judicature
Act. The former permits a claim for damages to be asserted "in the same
proceeding or in a separate proceeding" where a certificate has been regis-
tered without a reasonable claim to title to or interest in the land. Section
51 (4), on the other hand, would seem to require a claim for damages under
section 51(2) or (3) to be made in the original action. The plaintiff must
claim them in the action; the defendant is to claim any damages he has
suffered as a result of an order for interim recovery of personal property by
way of counterclaim.
Equally significant are the detailed procedural provisions applicable to
the prejudgment remedy of interim recovery of personal property. The gov-
erning Rule under the Committee's proposals is Rule 44. Pursuant to Rule
44.01(2), the defendant must be served with a Notice of Motion for an
order for the interim recovery of personal property, "unless the court is
satisfied that the property was unlawfully taken from the plaintiff or that
there is reason to believe that the defendant may attempt to prevent recovery
of the property or that, for any other sufficient reason, the order should be
made without notice." Rule 44.01 (1) also outlines in some detail the neces-
sary contents of the plaintiff's affidavit in support of a motion for such an
order.s
Again, Rule 44 sets out in considerable detail the broad discretion of
the court on a motion for an order for the interim recovery of personal
property. Where the defendant has been served with a copy of the Notice
of Motion, the court, under Rule 44.03(1), may:
(a) order the plaintiff to pay into court twice the value of the property as stated
in the order or such other amount as the court may direct, or to give the
appropriate sheriff security in such form and amount as may be approved
by the court, and direct the sheriff to take the property from the defendant
and deliver it to the plaintiff;
(b) order the defendant to pay into court twice the value of the property as
stated in the order, or such other amount as the court may direct, or to
give to the plaintiff security in such form and amount as may be approved
-3 Rule 44.01(1) states as follows:
44.01(1) An interim order for the recovery of personal property may be ob-
tained on a motion by the plaintiff supported by affidavit containing,
(a) a sufficient description of the property sought to be recovered to render it
readily identifiable;
(b) the value of the property sought to be recovered;
(c) a statement that the plaintiff is the owner or lawfully entitled to possession
of the property, as the case may be;
(d) a statement that the property was unlawfully taken from the possession of
the plaintiff or unlawfully detained by the defendant, as the case may be;
and
(e) the facts and circumstances giving rise to the unlawful taking or unlawful
detention.
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by the court, and allow the property to remain in the possession of the
defendant; or
(c) make such other order as may seem just.
If the motion for an interim order is ex parte, the court may "order the
plaintiff to pay into court twice the value of the property as stated in the
order, or such other amount as the court may direct, or to give the appro-
priate sheriff security in such form and amount as may be approved by the
court,"' as in the case of a motion upon notice to the defendant. The sheriff
in such a case, however, should be directed "to take and detain the property
for a period of 10 days after service of the interim order upon the defendant
before delivering it to the plaintiff."' 5 Presumably, this delay period has been
included to allow the defendant to apply to the court under Rule 44.05 "to
rescind or vary" the interim order. Rule 44.05 provides:
44.05 The defendant may apply to the court at any time to rescind or vary
an interim order for the recovery of personal property, or to stay proceedings
thereunder, or for any other relief with respect to the return, safety or sale of
the property or any part thereof by Notice of Motion served within 10 days
and returnable within 15 days after the order came to his attention.
Finally, reference should be made to Rule 44.08 of the proposed Rules,
which has no precursor in the existing Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of
Practice. This Rule provides that, if the sheriff advises the plaintiff that the
defendant has prevented him from recovering the property or any part of the
property referred to in the interim order, "the plaintiff may apply for an
order directing the sheriff to take any other personal property of the de-
fendant." This provision adds flexibility to the remedy of interim recovery of
personal property, and provides the plaintiff with greater prejudgment relief
than is the case at present under the Replevin Act"6 and the Supreme Court
of Ontario Rules of Practice.37
D. Setting Aside of a Default Judgment Upon Terms
Like the existing Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice, the pro-
posed Rules contain detailed provisions respecting default judgment. When
and how to obtain a default judgment are matters that are beyond the scope
of the present paper. What will be focused on, however, are the powers of
a court when it sets aside a default judgment. Rule 526 of the present Rules
does not provide much assistance in this regard, as the Rule states simply
that "[a]ny judgment by default may be set aside on motion." The simple
language of this Rule, however, masks the abundant case law concerned
with the courts' powers in such circumstances.2 8 It has been held, for ex-
ample, that "[w]here a judgment has been obtained irregularly the defendant
is entitled to have it set aside ex debito justitiae, in which case he does not
34 Report, supra note 1, s. 6, Rule 44.02(a).
25 Id.
36 R.S.O. 1980, c. 449.
37 R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 540.
38See 3 Holmested and Gale, supra note 20, at 2327-40 (Rel. 13, Mar. 1980).
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have to show a defence on the merits or explain any delay, and terms should
not be imposed."39 If, on the other hand, "the judgment sought to be set
aside is regular, the defendant must show a substantial ground of defence.
If merits are shown and an excuse for the default is given, the judgment may
be set aside in the discretion of the court, but terms may be imposed."40
In recent years, there has been some question about the authority of the
court to impose, as one of the terms upon which a regularly obtained judg-
ment will be set aside, the condition that any writ of execution issued pur-
suant to the judgment is not to be withdrawn. Given the general binding
effect of a writ of execution under section 10 of the Execution Act,41 the
significance of such a term should be obvious. Section 10(1) of the Execu-
tion Act provides:
10.-(1) Subject to The Land Titles Act and to section 11, a writ of execution
binds the goods and lands against which it is issued from the time of the delivery
thereof to the sheriff for execution, but save as to bills of sale and chattel mort-
gages, no writ of execution against goods prejudices the title to such goods ac-
quired by a person in good faith and for valuable consideration unless such
person had, at the time when he acquired his title, notice that such writ or any
other writ by virtue of which the goods of the execution debtor might be seized
or attached has been delivered to the sheriff and remains in his hands un-
executed.
Consequently, under this provision the defendant, practically speaking, would
be unable to dispose of any land bound by the writ. The defendant, however,
could still deal effectively with his goods, since a purchaser thereof in good
faith, for valuable consideration and without notice of the writ, would
acquire a good title to the goods.42
This particular type of prejudgment relief, as stated previously, has been
the subject of some controversy in Ontario. In Jet Power Credit Union Ltd.
v. McInally,4 O'Driscoll J. concluded that, although a court may impose
onerous conditions, including the payment into court of the sum in dispute,44
when setting aside a default judgment, it did not have the power to continue
a writ of execution. Mr. Justice O'Driscoll's reasons for so holding were as
follows:
Execution cannot issue before judgment; even after judgment, execution
cannot issue if the judgment has been satisfied because, in the words of Farwell
L.J.: "there is no judgment left on which to base the writ." Execution owes its
validity to the existence of an unpaid judgment. Once a judgment, upon which
the writ of execution is based is set aside, the execution ceases to be valid and
the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction cannot impose a term that "the
29 Williston and Rolls, supra note 20, Vol. 1, at 515 [Emphasis added].
40 Id. at 516 [Emphasis added].
41 R.S.O. 1980, c. 146, s. 10.
42 For a detailed discussion of the effect of s. 10(1) of the Execution Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 146, see O.L.R.C. Report, supra note 7, Part II, at 14-21.
43 (1973), 17 O.R. (2d) 59 (H.C.).
44 See e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Herrmann, [1975] 2 W.W.R. 368 (Sask. Q.B.) and
MacFarlane v. Briggs (1976), 15 N.B.R. (2d) 297 (Q.B.).
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execution stands as security pending trial, but that its operation be stayed" be-
cause such an order would be self-contradictory. 45
The decision of O'Driscoll J. in the Jet Power case, however, has now been
overruled. In Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Sheahan,46 Hughes
J., speaking for a majority of the Ontario Divisional Court, decided that Jet
Power had been wrongly decided. After reviewing a great many of the cases4 7
in which a court had resorted to the practice criticized by Mr. Justice
O'Driscoll, Hughes J. remarked:
It seems, however, to be well established that writs of fier facias, like other
writs, enjoy independent existence. Sir William Holdsworth's A History of En-
glish Law, 2nd ed., vol. IX, at p. 259, quotes HJ. Stephen's work on Pleading
to the effect that in early times "writs of execution are supposed to be actually
awarded by the judges in court; but no such award is in general actually made."
In Cotes v. Michill et at. (1681), 3 Lev. 20, 83 E.R. 555, it was held that
where action for trespass was brought against a bailiff and a lessor in ejectment,
the bailiff pleading the writ and the plaintiff demurring because no judgment was
shown upon which the writ was founded: "The plea is good, for the Sheriff and
his Bailiffs are bound to obey the King's Writs without Enquiry after the Judg-
ment. But if the Party himself had justified, he must have shewn a Judgment as
well as a writ." The principle that the Sheriff must obey the King's writs and
not look behind to the judgments upon which they are based has, as far as I
know, never been disturbed....
If, therefore, it is conceded, as I think it must be, that a writ of lleri facias has
a separate existence and is not merely an appendage to judgment, there is nothing
in my view which inhibits the procedure resorted to by so many Judges and
Masters of this Court, and one which must be well within its inherent powers. 48
Although one may well take issue with the reasoning of the Court in
Sheahan, a critique of this decision is beyond the scope of this paper.40 What
is important to note is the fact that the Committee has codified the approach
adopted by the Divisional Court in Sheahan. Rule 21.08 of the proposed
Rules reads:
21.08-1) Any judgment signed by the registrar against a party noted in default
may be set aside or varied by the court, upon such terms as may seem just.
(2) Any judgment obtained on a motion for judgment on the Statement of
Claim, either before or at the trial, may be set aside or varied by a judge on
such terms as may seem just.
4 5 Supra note 43, at 64.
46 (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 686, 94 D.L.R. (3d) 576 (Div. Ct.).
47See e.g., Whelihan v. Kehoe (1910), 2 O.W.N. 166 (H.C.); Brown v. Coleman
Development Co. (1913), 4 O.W.N. 728 (S.C.); Hunter v. Perrin (1917), 12 O.W.N.
200 (H.C.); Teasdale v. Welsh (1920), 19 O.W.N. 246 (H.C.); Staples and Bell Inc.
v. Canadian Coal Supply (1925), 28 O.W.N. 286 (H.C.); and Briar Investments Ltd. v.
Mintz, [1971 2 O.R. 747 (Master S.C.). See also Cotton v. Dempster, [1925] 1 W.W.R.
954 (Alta. S.C.) and Herrmann, supra note 44, at 371, citing Sales v. Sereda (1952),
5 W.W.R. (N.S.) 470 (Sask. Q.B.).
For an interesting recent case, see Larnu Distributors (1970) Ltd. v. Brochu (1980),
26 A.R. 373 (Q.B.), where the Court also considered the plaintiff's right to share in
the proceeds realized in the sale of any of the property bound under The Execution Act,
R.S.A. 1970, c. 128. In Ontario, see the Creditors' Relief Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 103.
4 SSupra note 46, at 691-92 (O.R.), 581-82 (D.L.R.).
49 It is one thing to say that a sheriff need not look behind a writ of execution.
It is quite another to say that a court, setting aside a judgment obtained by default, is
authorized to allow any writ obtained as a result of the default judgment to stand.
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(3) As a term of setting aside a default judgment, the court may, where
appropriate, allow any Writ of Seizure and Sale issued pursuant to the default
judgment to remain on file in the office of a sheriff, or in an office of Land
Titles, pending the final disposition of the action, on condition that any pro-
ceedings to enforce the Writ of Seizure and Sale be stayed in the meantime or
otherwise as the court may order.
Of particular interest with respect to Rule 21.08(3) is the fact that this pro-
vision does not seem to draw any distinction between a default judgment
regularly obtained and one that has not been obtained regularly. And while
the proposed Rules would do away with specially endorsed writs now avail-
able pursuant to Rule 33 of the Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice,
and the problems engendered thereby, 50 the distinction between a regularly
and an "irregularly" obtained default judgment would appear still to be
relevant under the new Rules. For instance, Rule 21.04 of the proposed
Rules specifies the cases in which a plaintiff may require the registrar to sign
judgment against the defendant. This right is available, for example, where
the plaintiff's claim is in respect of "a debt or a liquidated demand in
money."'i Given the difficulty that the courts have encountered in deciding
when a claim is for a liquidated demand in money under present Rule 33,52
it is not too hard to envisage the courts being plagued with the same problem
imder Rule 21.04. Therefore, as has already been indicated, it may be quite
significant that Rule 21.08 seems to be applicable generally to all default
judgments.
As is the case with the other prejudgment remedies prescribed by the
proposed Rules, Rule 21.08 leaves many questions unanswered. The Rule
gives no indication of the kinds of situations in which it would be appropriate
for the court to insist, as a term of setting aside a default judgment, that
"any Writ of Seizure and Sale issued pursuant to the default judgment
[should] remain on file in the office of a sheriff, or in an office of Land Titles
pending the final disposition of the action.... ." Nor does the Rule give any
indication of the strength of the plaintiff's case that would justify the imposi-
tion of such a condition.53 Unlike the provisions in the proposed Judicature
Act concerning the interim recovery of personal property,5 Rule 21.08 is
silent on the right of the defendant to claim damages from the plaintiff if
the latter ultimately fails in his action.
50See Bogart, Summary Judgment (1981), 19 Osgoode Hall L.J.
51 Proposed Rule 21.04(1) (a).
52See I Holmested and Gale, supra note 20, at 742-43 (Rel. 15, Oct. 1980), where
some of these cases are collected. For some recent efforts to end this controversy, see
Kennedy v. 315812 Ont. Ltd. (1976), 2 C.P.C. 281 (Ont. H.C.); Rasins v. Place Park
(Windsor) Ltd. (1977), 4 C.P.C. 63 (Master Ont. S.C.), High Point Mngt. Services
Ltd. v. Royal Bengal Restaurant Ltd. (1978), 19 O.R. (2d) 133, 6 C.P.C. 263 (Master
S.C.); Hammond v. Parsons (1978), 19 O.R. (2d) 162 (Master S.C.).
53 Interestingly, a defendant will only succeed in having such a default judgment
set aside by showing "a substantial ground of defence": see 1 Williston and Rolls, supra
note 20, at 516. Therefore, it would seem rather difficult to justify prejudgment relief
on the basis of the strength of the plaintiff's case.
54 Section 51.
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E. Security for Costs
A rather specialized prejudgment remedy available under the present
Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice that would continue to be avail-
able under the proposed Rules is an order for security for costs.", The pres-
ent practice regarding the obtaining of an order for security for costs would
be little changed under new Rule 58. The circumstances in which such an
order may be made would be somewhat narrower under Rule 58 than under
the existing Rule. The courts, however, would continue to have a wide dis-
cretion to grant an order for security for costs, for Rule 58.01 states:
58.01 In any action a plaintiff may be ordered to furnish security for costs where
it appears that,
(a) he is ordinarily resident out of Ontario;
(b) the defendant has a judgment or order against the plaintiff for costs
in another action, and those costs remain unpaid in whole or in part;
(c) his is a nominal plaintiff, and there is good reason to believe that he
has not sufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the defendant if
ordered to do so;
(d) it is a corporation, and there is good reason to believe that it has not
sufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the defendant if ordered
to do so; or
(e) the defendant is entitled by any statute to security for costs.
In the context of the present discussion, proposed Rule 58 raises some
important questions. For example, should a court on an application for an
order for security for costs be concerned with the merits of the plaintiff's
action? Under existing law, it would appear that it is improper for a court
to consider the merits of the action.56 Such a state of affairs would seem to
be rather harsh on a plaintiff with meagre funds who has a strong claim
against the defendant.
Another question upon which the Rule is silent is whether the court may
consider the plaintiff's means under Rule 58.01(a), (b) and (e). Why
should the mere fact of non-residency result in an order for security for
costs, if it is clear that the plaintiff has substantial property within the juris-
diction available to execution? Under the present law, the court, it would
seem, may take into account the plaintiff's means under Rule 373.67 Un-
doubtedly, the courts will have to determine whether the present law is
applicable to new Rule 58.
A third issue that may be raised in respect of new Rule 58 is the follow-
55 R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 545, r. 373 et seq. The present rule provides that security for
costs may be granted in the following circumstances:
373.-(1) Security for costs may be ordered,
(a) where the plaintiff resides out of Ontario;
(b) where the plaintiff is ordinarily resident out of Ontario, though he may be
temporarily resident within Ontario;
(c) where the plaintiff has brought another action or proceeding for the same
cause which is pending in Ontario or in any other country; ...
56 See 1 Williston and Rolls, supra note 20, at 564.
57 Id., Vol. 1, at 577.
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ing: should the defendant who has succeeded in obtaining an order for
security for costs, but who has been found liable to the plaintiff, be subject
to any sanction? Should the defendant in such a case, for example, be liable
to a claim for any damages suffered by the plaintiff forced to provide secur-
ity, as is permitted in the case of a plaintiff who has secured an order for
the interim recovery of personal property but has failed in his action against
the defendant? Although not identical, the circumstances would seem
analogous.
F. Conclusion
This Part of the paper described in very general terms the prejudgment
remedies to be found in the new Judicature Act and Rules of Civil Procedure
proposed by the Civil Procedure Revision Committee. What is most striking
about the provisions respecting certificates of pending litigation, orders for
the preservation of personal property, orders for the interim recovery of per-
sonal property, orders to maintain on file a writ of seizure and sale as a
condition for the setting aside of a default judgment, and orders for security
for costs, is their lack of uniformity. While some deal expressly with the
question of notice, others do not; while some provide a remedy for the
plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, for damages suffered as a result
of the prejudgment relief being granted, others do not; and while some deal
specifically with the powers of the court to vary the particular order, others
do not. None of the provisions for prejudgment relief examined in this Part
outlines the onus that rests on the person seeking relief. Because the Com-
mittee did not include a detailed discussion of the provisions of either the
proposed Judicature Act or the proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, one can
only intuit the basis for the different treatment accorded each of the remedies
in question.
III. THE MAREVA INJUNCTION: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE
As previously indicated in the introduction, there have been two note-
worthy developments in the area of prejudgment remedies in Ontario: the
Report of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee and the rise of the
Mareva injunction. Part I of this paper focused on the proposals or recom-
mendations of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee respecting prejudg-
ment relief. This Part examines the development of the Mareva injunction
as a more comprehensive solution to the problems of prejudgment relief.
Part III is divided into three sections. The first section describes the creation
of the Mareva injunction in England. In the second section, the scope of this
jurisdiction is examined. Matters ancillary to the granting of a Mareva in-
junction are reviewed in the third section.
It is not maintained that the Mareva injunction can replace all the pre-
judgment remedies discussed in Part II. The Mareva injunction, however,
is a sound and practical alternative to some of those remedies, for example,
a certificate of pending litigation and an order for the preservation of prop-
erty. In addition, the Mareva injunction jurisprudence is an important prece-
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dent for the manner in which the competing interests of debtor, creditor and
third parties may be balanced.
A. The Rise of the Mareva Injunction in England
The Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of Judgment Debts,58
published in England in 1969, contained the following statement regarding
the power of the English courts to grant an interlocutory injunction to re-
strain a defendant from disposing of his assets: "It is, we think, clear that
at the present time an injunction under this section [45 (1) of the Supreme
Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925] would not be granted to
restrain a debtor from disposing of assets or removing them from the juris-
diction."'59 Few persons, if any, in 1969 doubted the correctness of this de-
scription of the law. After all, it was supported by long standing authority. 60
Therefore, it must have come as quite a surprise to the authors of the Report
of the Committee on the Enforcement of Judgment Debts to discover in the
middle of the last decade that as a result of a trilogy of cases,61 courts in
58 Payne Committee (Cmnd. 3909, 1969).
59 ld. at 324, para. 1251. The report recommended that such a prejudgment injunc-
tion should be available in certain cases. The Committee was particularly impressed by
recent technological changes making the disposition of one's assets simpler and speedier:
1252. Under modem conditions of travel, particularly as the cost of air travel is
now within the means of many a debtor, the risk of goods and chattels, or sub-
stantial sums of money being taken out of the country is greatly increased. It is
possible to imagine countless circumstances in which a power to restrain a debtor
could be justified but one will suffice. A debtor may buy valuable jewellery on
credit, ignore demands for payment and ignore a writ or summons. The jeweller
may not know where the jewellery is. If he happens to discover that the debtor
has booked an air passage and proposes to leave England a few days later and
before any progress can be made with the action which has been commenced is
there anyone who would argue in these days that the court should not have power
to order that the debtor should not remove the jewellery from the jurisdiction or
otherwise dispose of it?
See also Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA, [1979] Q.B. 645 at 670, [1979]
3 W.L.R. 122 at 139, [1979] 2 All E.R. 972 at 986, [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 184 at 190,
per Lawton L.J.:
Nowadays defaulting on debts has been made easier for the foreign debtor by the
use of corporations, many of which hide the identities of those who control them,
and of so-called flags of convenience, together with the development of world
wide banking and swift communications. By a few words spoken into a radio
telephone or tapped out on a telex machine bank balances can be transferred
from one country to another and within seconds can come to rest in a bank
which is untraceable or, even if known, such balances cannot be reached by any
effective legal process.
GO See e.g., Stubbs, supra note 14.
61 The reported English cases dealing with the Mareva injunction jurisdiction are
numerous. The cases include the following: Nippon Yusen Kaisha, supra note 13; The
Mareva, supra note 2; Rasu Maritima SA v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina), [1978] Q.B. 644, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 518, [1977] 3 All
E.R. 324, [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 397 (C.A.); Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera SA,
[1979] A.C. 210, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 818, [1977] 3 All E.R. 803, [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1
(H.L.); Cretanor Maritime Co. Ltd. v. Irish Marine Mngt. Ltd., [1978] 1 W.L.R.
966, [1978] 3 All E.R. 164; The Rena K, [1979] Q.B. 377, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 431,
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England became empowered to grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain
a debtor defendant from disposing of assets.62
The English prejudgment relief revolution began with the decision of
the English Court of Appeal in Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis,63 a
charter party case, as many of the cases have been. The plaintiff, a large
Japanese shipowner, claimed to be entitled to an injunction against the de-
fendants to restrain them from disposing of or removing any of their assets
in England, which in this case happened to be funds on deposit in a London
bank. The defendants had chartered a number of the plaintiff's ships.
In granting the relief requested, Lord Denning M.R., relied on the
power of the High Court to issue an injunction in all cases in which it
appears to the court to be "just or convenient so to do." 64 His Lordship was
of the view that an injunction should be granted for two reasons. First, the
plaintiff had "a strong prima facie case."65 Second, he concluded that, if an
injunction were not granted in this case, the funds on deposit might be
"removed out of the jurisdiction and the shipowners will have the greatest
difficulty in recovering anything." 6 Neither Lord Denning M.R., nor Browne
and Geoffrey Lane L.JJ., set out the evidence upon which they based their
belief that the defendants intended to deal with the money in their account
to the detriment of the plaintiff.
The Mareva injunction gets its name from the second of the trilogy of
[1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 545; Etablissement Esfka Int'l Anstalt v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 445 (C.A.); Negocious Del Mar SA v. Doric Shipping
Corp. SA; The Assios, [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 331 (C.A.); Gebr van Weelde Scheepvaart
Kantoor B.Y. v. Homeric Marine Services; The Agrabele, [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 117
(Q.B.); Montecchi v. Shimco (U.K.) Ltd., [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1180 (C.A.); Iraqi Ministry
of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co. SA, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 488, [19801 1 All E.R. 480,
[1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 632 (Q.B.); Chartered Bank v. Daklouche, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 107,
[1980] 1 All E.R. 205 (C.A.); Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259, [1980]
3 All E.R. 190 (Ch.); Allen v. Jambo Holdings Ltd., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1252, [1980]
2 All E.R. 502 (C.A.); Rahman (Prince Abdul) Bin Turki al Sudairy v. Abu-Taha,
[1980] 1 W.L.R. 1268, [1980] 3 All E.R. 409 (C.A.); Stewart Chartering Ltd. v. C. &
0. Mngt. SA, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 460, [1980] 1 All E.R. 718 (Q.B.); A. v. C., [1981] 2
W.L.R. 629, [1980] 2 All E.R. 347 (Q.B.); Bankers' Trust Co. v. Shapira, [1980] 1
W.L.R. 1274, [1980] 3 All E.R. 353, (1980), 124 Sol. J. 480 (C.A.); A.J. Bekhor &
Co. v. Hilton, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 601 (C.A.); A. v. C. (No. 2), [1981] 2 W.L.R. 634,
[1981] 2 All E.R. 126 (Q.B.); Searose v. Seatrain U.K. Ltd., [1981] 1 All E.R. 806
(Q.B.); MBPXL Corp. v. Int'l Banking Corp., unrep. Aug. 28, 1975 (C.A.); Ibrahim
Shaker Co. v. Distos Compania Naviera SA, [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 404 (C.A.); Naz v.
Kaleem, [1980] 7 C.L. 26 (Co. Ct); Third Chandris Shipping, supra note 59.
62 It would appear that this prejudgment remedy has become quite popular in
England. There are now approximately twenty Mareva injunctions granted each month:
see Third Chandris, supra note 59, at 650 (Q.B.), 126 (W.L.R.), 976 (All E.R.), per
Mustill J.
6-3 Supra note 13.
64 Supra note 13, at 1095 (W.L.R.), 283 (All E.R.), 138 (Lloyd's Rep.); see also
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 49, s. 45(1).
65Supra note 13, at 1095 (W.L.R.), 283 (All E.R.), 138 (Lloyd's Rep.).
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cases responsible for its birth, Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. Int'l Bulk-
carriers SA (The Mareva),17 another charter party case. There the English
Court of Appeal sought to put the type of injunction granted in the Kara-
georgis case on a sound legal footing. In order to do so, the Court had to
distinguish or overrule one of its own decisions, Lister & Co. v. Stubbs,0 8
an authority that had not been seriously questioned in over three-quarters
of a century.
In the Mareva case, Lord Denning M.R., refused to follow Stubbs, not-
ing that section 45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation)
Act 1925 gave the Court a broad power to grant an interlocutory injunc-
tion to protect a person's legal or equitable right. The Master of the Rolls
remarked that "a creditor who has a right to be paid the debt owing to him,
even before he has established his right by getting a judgment for it,"70 is
entitled to protection. His Lordship conveniently ignored the many cases in
which it had been decided that a creditor claiming to be entitled to relief is
possessed of no legal or equitable right before judgment sufficient to support
an injunction to restrain his debtor from disposing of his assets pending the
trial of the action.7'1 Roskill L.J., on the other hand, in finding in favour of
the plaintiff's request for an injunction, distinguished Stubbs on much nar-
rower grounds. He noted that the charter, party contained a clause entitling
the owners of the ship to a lien "upon all cargoes, and all subfreights for
any amounts due"72 and, accordingly, concluded that the plaintiff's applica-
tion for an injunction did not fall within the four comers of the Court of
Appeal's earlier decision in Stubbs.
The last of the trilogy of cases that firmly established the right of a
creditor, before judgment, to obtain an order restraining his debtor from
dealing with his assets to the creditor's detriment is Rasu Maritima SA v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina).73
In this case, as in the earlier two cases, the plaintiff's claim was founded
upon a charter party. Unlike the Karageorgis and Mareva decisions, how-
ever, the Court in Rasu Maritima dismissed the plaintiff's application, but
in the process took the opportunity to catalogue the conditions that a plaintiff
must satisfy before a Mareva injunction will issue.
In Rasu Maritima, the plaintiff requested an interlocutory injunction to
67 Supra note 2.
68 Supra note 14.
69 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 49.
rOSupra note 2, at 215 (All E.R.), 510 (Lloyd's Rep.).
71 See e.g., Stubbs, supra note 14; Robinson v. Pickering (1881). Ch. D. 660, 44
L.T. 165, 29 W.R. 385; Newton v. Newton (1885), 11 P.D. 11, 34 W.R. 123, 55 L.J.P.
13. The Ont. cases in which it has been so held include Burdett v. Fader (1904), 7
O.L.R. 72, 3 O.W.R. 289 (Div. Ct.); Bedell v. Gefaell (No. 2), [1938] O.R. 726 (C.A.).
See also the Man. case of Ferguson v. Ferguson (1916), 26 Man, R. 269, 29 D.L.R.
364, 10 W.W.R. 113 (K.B.).
72 Supra note 2, at 216 (All E.R.), 511 (Lloyd's Rep.).
7 3 Supra note 61.
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restrain the defendant from disposing of equipment that it had ordered and
that was sitting on the Liverpool docks. The evidence before the Court
indicated that the defendant had taken steps to dispose of its assets. The
equipment was valued at $12 million (U.S.), but if sold for scrap it would
only bring in $350,000. From the material before the Court, it was unclear
whether ownership of the equipment had already passed to the defendant,
or whether the seller still retained the right of ownership.
In this case, Lord Denning M.R., provided the historical basis for the
court's new Mareva injunction jurisdiction. As a precedent for the Mareva
injunction, he pointed to the remedy of foreign attachment74 that was avail-
able in parts of England until well into the 19th century. He also noted the
availability of similar remedies in the United States and in continental
Europe.
The Master of the Rolls also rejected a number of restrictions that it
had been suggested should be placed on the availability of Mareva injunc-
tions. First, Lord Denning M.R., refused to limit the remedy to cases in
which the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment: 75 "an order restraining
removal of assets can be made whenever the plaintiff can show that he has a
'good arguable case'." 76 Second, his Lordship was not willing to see the
remedy restricted to cases in which the asset at risk is money. He cautioned,
however, that "[c]are should be taken before an injuction is granted over
assets which will bring the defendant's trade or business to a standstill or will
inflict on him great loss." 77 Thirdly, Lord Denning M.R., saw no objection
to employing a Mareva injunction as a means to compel a defendant to
provide the plaintiff with security. 8
The plaintiff's application for a Mareva injunction was rejected in this
case, however, on the grounds that it was not just or convenient to grant the
relief sought. There was considerable uncertainty about the validity of the
plaintiff's claim. As mentioned earlier, doubt also surrounded the ownership
of the goods sought to be made subject to a Mareva injunction. Moreover,
the Court was influenced by the evidence that the goods, if sold as scrap,
would fetch only a small percentage of their true value. Finally, Lord
Denning M.R., noted that the property in question was bound for West
74 Supra note 61, at 657 (Q.B.), 524 (W.L.R.), 331 (All E.R.), 401 (Lloyd's
Rep.). For a general discussion of the doctrine of foreign attachment, see Drake, A
Treatise on the Law of Suits by Attachment in the United States (7th ed., Boston:
Little Brown, 1891) ch. 1; Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical
Perspective (N.Y.: Law Centre of N.Y.U., 1952), ch. 26; Levy, Attachment, Garnish-
ment and Garnishment Execution: Some American Problems in the Light of the English
Experience (1972-73), 5 Conn. L. Rev. 399.
75 See 1965 English Rules of the Supreme Court, Ord. 14.
70Supra note 61, at 661 (Q.B.), 528 (W.L.R.), 334 (All E.R.), 404 (Lloyd's
Rep.).
77 id.
78 Id. at 663 (Q.B.), 529 (W.L.R.), 335 (All E.R.), 404 (Lloyd's Rep.).
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Germany, where "they will be just as much liable to seizure as in England,
and probably more so." 79
Before turning to a discussion of some of the other significant Mareva
injunction cases, a few words should be said about the manner in which Lord
Denning M.R., distinguished the Stubbs line of authorities in Rasu Maritima.
His Lordship remarked that none of these cases had concerned a "defendant
who was out of the jurisdiction but had money or goods in this country,"80
save one, where the point was not canvassed. Insofar as cases respecting
non-resident defendants were concerned, he believed that the principle to be
applied should be that employed by the customary courts under the doctrine
of foreign attachment. Towards the conclusion of his judgment Lord Denning
M.R. added the following comment: "I think the courts have a discretion,
in advance of judgment, to issue an injunction to restrain the removal of
assets, whether the defendant is within the jurisdiction or outside it. This
discretion should not be fettered by rigid rules.""' Earlier in his judgment,
however, the Master of the Rolls had stated that, "[s]o far as concerns
defendants who are within the jurisdiction.., and have assets here, it is well
established that the court should not, in advance of any order or judgment,
allow the creditor to seize any of the money or goods of the debtor or to use
any legal process to do so.'a' Although the confusion engendered by these
conflicting remarks of Lord Denning M.R., in Rasu Maritima has been laid
to rest in recent years,83 the controversy could have been avoided by a
somewhat closer analysis of Stubbs.
The plaintiff in Stubbs8 brought an action against its employee, alleging
that the latter had received secret profits and commissions from one of the
plaintiff's buyers. As a result, the plaintiff claimed to be entitled to an
accounting and damages, and to trace the monies received by the defendant
and invested by him in securities and realty. To protect its claim, the plain-
tiff requested an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant from
dealing with the realty, as well as an order directing the defendant to bring
79 Id. Interestingly the possibility of enforcement of a judgment in a foreign juris-
diction recently has been accepted by some courts as a ground for refusing an order
for security for costs. See e.g., Greensteel Ind. Ltd. v. Binks Mfg. Co. (1982), 35 O.R.
(2d) 45 (C.A.); Dietrich-Collins Equip. Ltd. v. Gen'l Motors of Can. (1981), 31 O.R.
(2d) 698 (H.CJ.), rev'g on other grounds (1981), 31 O.R. (2d) 687 (Master S.C.);
Richmond v. Canadian Exhibition Ass'n. (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 781, 104 D.L.R.
(3d) 317, 11 C.P.C. 184 (H.C.J.) and Diurasevic v. Canadian General Ins. Co., [1974]
I.R.I. at 1-589 (N.S.C.A.). Compare Goldberg v. DeLorey (1980), 30 N.B.R. (2d)
395, 70 A.P.R. 395 (Q.B.). Some of the recent cases are discussed in Banfai, The Effect
of Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Legislation on Obtaining Security for Costs
(1980), 2 Adv. Q. 344.
8OSupra note 61, at 659 (Q.B.), 526 (W.L.R.), 332 (All E.R.), 402 (Lloyd's
Rep.).
81 Id. at 663 (Q.B.), 530 (W.L.R.), 336 (All E.R.), 405 (Lloyd's Rep.). [Emphasis
added].
82 Id. at 659 (Q.B.), 526 (W.L.R.), 332 (All E.R.), 402 (Lloyd's Rep.).
83 Spe text accompanying notes 105-116.
84 Supra note 14.
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the other investments and any cash into court. The Court of Appeal unani-
mously rejected the plaintiff's application for an injunction. In his judgment,
Cotton L.J. was concerned primarily with the question whether the defendant
could be ordered to deliver up to the court the cash and securities. He stated
that he did not know of any case "where, because it was highly probable
that if the action were brought to a hearing the plaintiff could establish that
a debt was due to him from the defendant, the defendant has been ordered
to give security until that has been established."85 Neither Cotton L.J., nor
the other members of the Court dealt expressly with the plaintiff's claim for
an injunction in respect of the realty purchased with the alleged secret profits
and commissions. All were of the view that the plaintiff was not entitled to
trace the secret profits and commissions allegedly received by the defendant
to the property purchased with this money. This was certainly the view of
the judge at first instance, Stirling J.: "the Plaintiffs are not entitled to follow
the money; and therefore the injunction, so far as it seeks to restrain the
Defendant from dealing with the property in which this money has been,
as alleged, invested, must fail."86 Accordingly, Stubbs does not stand for
the proposition that a court has no power to restrain a defendant from
disposing of his property before judgment. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's
claim for an injunction in that case on the basis that it had not established
its right to trace. And the Court of Appeal's comments regarding prejudg-
ment relief were made in response to the plaintiff's request to require the
defendant to provide it with security, not with respect to injunctive relief of
the kind provided by a Mareva injunction.
To this point, the birth of the Mareva injunction in England has been
described. Passing reference has been made to the prerequisites for a Mareva
injunction, but there has been no attempt to deal comprehensively with this
subject. Attention should be turned to a consideration of the conditions that
must be satisfied before a court will issue a Mareva injunction.
Two cases in particular are relevant to the discussion of the require-
ments for Mareva injunction relief: Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Uni-
marine SA8 7 and Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill.88 For the purposes of the present
discussion, the facts in these two cases are unimportant. In Third Chandris,
Lord Denning M.R., set out five "guidelines" for the granting of a Mareva
injunction, and they may be summarized as follows. First, as is the case with
any application for an injunction, the plaintiff must "make full and frank
disclosure of all matters in his knowledge which are material for the judge
to know." 9 Second, and related to the first condition, the plaintiff should
state with some particularity his claim against the defendant, the amount
thereof, and "the points made against it by the defendant."90 The third
85 Id. at 13 (Ch. D.), 76 (L.T.), 549 (W.R.).
86 Id. at 11 (Ch. D.).
8 7 Supra note 59.
88 Supra note 61.
89Supra note 59, at 137 (W.L.R.), 984 (All E.R.), 189 (Lloyd's Rep.).
90 ld.
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guideline enunciated by Lord Denning M.R. was that the applicant for a
Mareva injunction "should give some grounds for believing that the defend-
ants have assets in the jurisdiction." 91 Fourth, the plaintiff must state the
grounds for his belief "that there is a risk of the assets being removed before
the judgment... is satisfied. '92 Insofar as this fourth guideline is concerned,
the comments of Lord Denning M.R. are quite important. He observed that
"[the mere fact that the defendant is abroad is not by itself sufficient."9 3 He
added, however, the following remarks with respect to foreign corporations:
No one would wish any reputable foreign company to be plagued with a Ma-
reva injunction simply because it has agreed to London arbitration. But there
are some foreign companies whose structure invites comment. We often see in
this court a corporation which is registered in a country where the company law
is so loose that nothing is known about it, where it does no work and has no
officers and no assets. Nothing can be found out about the membership, or its
control, or its assets, or the charges on them. Judgment cannot be enforced
against it. There is no reciprocal enforcement of judgments. It is nothing more
than a name grasped from the air, as elusive as the Cheshire cat. In such cases
the very fact of incorporation there gives some ground for believing there is a
risk that, if judgment or an award is obtained, it may go unsatisfied. Such reg-
istration of such companies may carry many advantages to the individuals who
control them, but they may suffer the disadvantage of having a Mareva injunc-
tion granted against them. The giving of security for a debt is a small price to
pay for the convenience of such a registration. Security would certainly be re-
quired in New York. So also it may be in London.9 4
The last of the five guidelines described by the Master of the Rolls, like the
first, is not unique to Mareva injunctions, but is applicable to all interlocu-
tory injunction applications. Applicants for a Mareva injunction must give
an "undertaking in damages, in case they fail in their claim or the injunction
turns out to be unjustified"95 and, in appropriate cases, the undertaking
should be "supported by a bond or security."""
In Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, Megarry V.C. added a number of other
conditions to the list of guidelines pronounced by Lord Denning M.R. in
Third Chandris. The Vice Chancellor commented that mere proof that there
is a risk of the defendant removing his assets from the jurisdiction before
judgment is satisfied is not sufficient. In his opinion, the plaintiff seeking a
Mareva injunction is required to establish as well that "there is a danger of
default if the assets are removed from the jurisdiction.197 He added that "[a]
reputable foreign company, accustomed to paying its debts, ought not to be
91 Id.
92 Id. at 138 (W.L.R.), 985 (All E.R.), 189 (Lloyd's Rep.).
93 Id.
94 Id.
951d. For a brief discussion of this condition for the obtaining of any kind of
interlocutory injunction, see Sharpe, "Interlocutory Injunctions: The Post American
Cyanamid Position," in Gertner, ed., Studies in Civil Procedure (Toronto: Butterworths,
1979) 185 at 191-92.
961d.
97 Supra note 61, at 1265 (W.L.R.), 195 (All E.R.).
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prevented from removing its assets from the jurisdiction, especially if it has
substantial assets in countries in which English judgments can be enforced." 98
Another important condition for a Mareva injunction discussed by
Mrgarry V.C. is the need to show that "the balance of convenience is in
favour of granting it."9 9 In this way, Megarry V.C. sought to rationalize the
Mareva injunction line of authorities with Stubbs and its progeny. He stated
as follows:
In considering this in Mareva cases, I think that some weight must be given to
the principle of Lister & Co. v. Stubbs .... The Mareva prohibition against mak-
ing any disposition of the assets within the country is a normal ancillary of the
prohibition against removing the assets from the country, and if this is likely to
affect the defendant seriously I think that he is entitled to have this put into the
scales against the grant of the injunction. Much may depend on the assets in
question. If, as in many of the reported cases, there is merely an isolated asset
here, the harm to the defendant may be small. On the other hand, if he is trad-
ing here and the injunction would "freeze" his bank account, the injury may be
grave. I think that he should be able to rely on the Lister principle except so far
as it cannot be fairly reconciled with the needs of the Mareva doctrine. I would
regard the Lister principle as remaining the rule, and the Mareva doctrine as
constituting a limited exception to it.10
B. The Scope of the Mareva Injunction Jurisdiction
Despite attempts to limit the circumstances in which a creditor will be
able to secure a Mareva injunction, few restrictions have been imposed on
this prejudgment remedy. As noted earlier, Lord Denning M.R. in the Rasu
Maritima case dealt summarily with two alleged limitations on the courts'
power to restrain a defendant from disposing of his assets before judgment.
The Master of the Rolls refused to limit the availability of Mareva injunc-
tions to Order 14 cases, that is, cases where the plaintiff may be entitled to
summary judgment.' 0 ' Orr L.J. in the same case, correctly pointed out the
ease with which a defendant can avoid summary judgment and the dangers
of denying to the plaintiff in such a case the protection of a Mareva injunc-
tion.x02 Lord Denning M.R. in Rasu Maritima also rejected the suggestion
that Mareva injunctions should be employed only in respect of money.0 3
There would seem to be little doubt today that a Mareva injunction is
available in cases other than those in which the plaintiff is able to secure
summary judgment. Similarly, with one exception, it would appear that it has
been firmly established that any of the defendant's assets, and not simply
money, may be "frozen" by a Mareva injunction. It may be, however, that
a Mareva injunction will not issue to restrain a defendant from disposing of
98 id.
99 Id. The role of this factor in applications for other types of interlocutory in-junctions is discussed in considerable detail in Sharpe, supra note 94, at 192.
'O0 Supra note 61, at 1265-66 (W.L.R.), 195 (All E.R.).
101 Supra note 61, at 661 (Q.B.), 528 (W.L.R.), 334 (All E.R.), 403 (Lloyd's
Rep.).
102 Id. at 655 (Q.B.), 531 (W.L.R.), 337 (All E.R.), 405 (Lloyd's Rep.).
103 Id. at 662 (Q.B.), 528 (W.L.R.), 334 (All E.R.), 404 (Lloyd's Rep.).
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land. In Naz v. Kaleem, Harris J. observed that, since the third guideline
laid down in the Third Chandris case was that the plaintiff must show that
there is a risk of the assets being removed from the country before he will
be entitled to a Mareva injunction, this prejudgment remedy would seem to
be inappropriate if the defendant's assets are immovables.1' 4 Given the
following remarks of Megarry V.C. in Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, the sugges-
tion that land should be immune from a Mareva injunction may well be
correct:
If the assets are likely to remain in the jurisdiction, then the plaintif, like all
others with claims against the defendant, must run the risk, common to all,
that the defendant may dissipate his assets, or consume them in discharging
other liabilities, and so leave nothing with which to satisfy any judgment. On the
other hand, if there is a real risk of the assets being removed from the jurisdic-
tion, a Mareva injunction will prevent their removal. It is not enough for such
an injunction merely to forbid the defendant to remove them from the jurisdic-
tion, for otherwise he might transfer them to some collaborator who would then
remove them; accordingly, the injunction will restrain the defendant from dis-
posing of them even within the jurisdiction.105 [Emphasis added.]
Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue, insofar as the scope of the
Mareva injunction jurisdiction is concerned, has been whether the remedy
should be available against defendants within the jurisdiction. It will be re-
called that Lord Denning M.R. in Rasu Maritima distinguished the long-
standing authority of Stubbs on the basis that that case dealt with a defendant
in the jurisdiction. Yet, his Lordship in the same case expressed the view
that "the courts have a discretion, in advance of judgment, to issue an in-
junction to restrain the removal of assets, whether the defendant is within the
jurisdiction or outside it."'u0
Any confusion that the judgment of the Master of the Rolls in the Rasu
Maritima case engendered would now appear to have been dissipated. The
English courts, on a number of occasions, have been asked to issue a Mareva
injunction against a defendant in England, and they have acceded to the
request. Not surprisingly, the main proponent of the view that a defendant
within the jurisdiction should be subject to a Mareva injunction has been
Lord Denning M.R.
The issue appears to have been addressed comprehensively for the first
time in the case of Chartered Bank v. Daklouche.107 The defendants in this
case were of Lebanese origin with business interests in Abu Dhabi. They
had moved to England, and had established residence there, while continuing
to carry on business in Abu Dhabi. In January 1979, Mr. Daklouche en-
countered some financial difficulties, and his Abu Dhabi account with the
plaintiff bank soon became overdrawn. Despite a promise to pay off the
overdraft with monies received from the payment of certain trade debts,
1o4 Supra note 61.
105 Supra note 61, at 1264 (W.L.R.), 194 (All E.R.).
106Supra note 61, at 663 (Q.B.), 530 (W.L.R.), 336 (All E.R.), 405 (Lloyd's
Rep.) [Emphasis added-].
107 Supra note 61.
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three cheques received by the corporation controlled by the defendants were
paid into an account with another bank in Abu Dhabi, and the money even-
tually found its way into an account in the name of Mrs. Daklouche in
London, England. Upon learning of these happenings, the plaintiff bank
moved immediately for a Mareva injunction to prevent the defendants from
dealing with a sum equal to the proceeds of the trade debts that should have
been deposited in the account the defendants had with the plaintiff bank.
Referring first to his initial statement in Rasu Maritima, in which he
suggested that a Mareva injunction should not issue against "defendants who
are within the jurisdiction of the court and have assets here," Lord Denning
M.R. asserted that this statement was applicable only to "cases where de-
fendants were permanently settled here and had their assets here."108
Daklouche did not come within these terms, since the defendant, Mrs.
Daklouche, was a Lebanese citizen, and only late in the proceedings indi-
cated that it was her intention to live permanently in England. But, again,
his Lordship was not satisfied to decide the case on the narrow basis that
Mrs. Daklouche was not permanently resident in England. He went on to
suggest that "[t]he law should be that there is jurisdiction to grant a Mareva
injunction even though the defendant may be served" 109 in England. If the
defendant "makes a fleeting visit, or if there is a danger that he may abscond
or that the assets or money may disappear and be taken out of the reach of
the creditors, a Mareva injunction can be granted."" 0 Interestingly, nowhere
in his judgment does Lord Denning M.R. refer to Stubbs, although the case
was cited to the Court. With the stroke of his pen, the Master of the Rolls
sought to alter the law of- prejudgment relief in England that had, until
recently, remained unchanged for nearly one hundred years.
The next assault on Stubbs came in the case of Barclay-Johnson v.
Yuill," n to which reference already has been made. There Megarry V.C.
dealt in considerable detail with the defendant's objection that "no Mareva
injunction can be granted against a defendant who is not a foreigner."1 2
After commenting that the "heart and core of the Mareva injunction is the
risk of the defendant removing his assets from the jurisdiction and so stulti-
fying any judgment given by the courts in the action,"113 he stated as
follows:
If, then, the essence of the jurisdiction is the risk of the assets being removed
from the jurisdiction, I cannot see why it should be confined to "foreigners," in
any sense of that term. True, expressions such as "foreign defendants" ... ap-
pear in the cases, and for the most part the cases have concerned those who may
fairly be called foreigners. Indeed, in the Siskina case... Lord Diplock puts the
jurisdiction in terms of a foreign defendant who does not reside or have a
place of business within the jurisdiction, though I would read this as being de-
108 Id. at 112 (W.L.R.), 209 (All E.R.).
100 id. at 113 (W.L.R.), 210 (All E.R.).
110 Id.
Ill Supra note 61.
112 id. at 1262 (W.L.R.), 192 (All E.R.).
113 Id. at 1264 (W.L.R.), 194 (All E.R.).
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scriptive of the past rather than restrictive of the future. Naturally the risk of
removal of assets from the jurisdiction will usually be greater or more obvious
in the case of foreign-based defendants, and so the jurisdiction has grown up in
relation to them. But I cannot see why this should make some requirement of
foreignness a prerequisite of the jurisdiction. If, for example, an Englishman who
has lived and worked all his life in England is engaged in making arrangements
to emigrate and remove all his assets with him, is the court to say "He is not
a foreigner, nor is he yet foreign-based, and so no Mareva injunction can be
granted?" Why should it make all the difference if instead he had been a foreign
national with a foreign domicile who, after living and working here for a while,
was preparing to leave with his assets? Is it really to be said that in relation to
Mareva injunctions, there is one law for the foreigner and another for the En-
glish, and that this flows from a statutory power to grant an injunction if it ap-
pears to the court to be "just or convenient" to do so? I cannot see any sensible
ground for holding that in this respect there is some privilege or immunity for
the English and Welsh.'2 4
He concluded his remarks on this issue by pointing out that matters of na-
tionality, domicile, residence and so on may well be relevant to the determi-
nation of whether there is a real risk of removal of his assets from the
jurisdiction by the defendant. 1 5 He illustrated some of the ways in which
these matters might be relevant:
If the defendant has not even come to this country, the risk of his assets here
being removed abroad will normally be high. If a foreign national is here, his
nationality will often make it easier for him at short notice to go abroad with
his assets, and remain there, easier than for a citizen of the United Kingdom;
and his foreign domicile would render it more probable that he would do this.116
The approach espoused by Megarry V.C. in Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill
seems to have received the sanction of the English Court of Appeal in
Rahman (Prince Abdul) bin Turki al Sudairy v. Abu-Taha."17 Lord Denning
M.R. in this case quoted approvingly the remarks of Megarry V.C. set
out above, and affirmed the principle that he himself had enunciated in
Daklouche.118
With respect to the kinds of case in which a Mareva injunction may be
granted, the more subsidiary issue with which the courts have grappled is
whether such relief should be available in non-commercial cases. The trilogy
of cases that gave birth to the Mareva injunction, it will be recalled, each
concerned a charter party dispute. And while the vast majority of cases in
which a Mareva injunction has been requested have, indeed, been commer-
cial cases, nevertheless, there would seem to be little doubt about the pro-
priety of such relief in non-commercial cases.
In Allen v. Jambo Holdings Ltd.,"19 the English Court of Appeal was
14 Id. at 1264-65 (W.L.R.), 194-95 (All E.R.).
"15 Id. at 1265 (W.L.R.), 195 (All E.R.).
116 Id.
117 Supra note 61.
1181d. at 1271-72 (W.L.R.), 411 (All E.R.).
.119 Supra note 61. For an interesting discussion of this case, see Lord Denning,
The Due Process of Law (London: Butterworths, 1980) at 148-49. In Ont., see Quinn
v. Marsta Session Services Ltd. (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 659 (H.C.J.).
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required to answer the very issue posed above. The plaintiff in Allen was the
widow of an airplane passenger who was killed by the propellor of the plane
that was to carry him and his wife. The widow brought an action claiming,
inter alia, damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.120 All three mem-
bers of the Court of Appeal saw no reason to restrict the Mareva injunction
jurisdiction to commercial cases. The matter was perhaps best summed up by
Templeman L.J.:
I can see no difference between a Mareva injunction in a commercial action and
a Mareva injunction for personal injury or any other cause of action save this,
that in the kind of actions in which Mareva injunctions have been granted, where
the contest is between two big commercial concerns, there is usually very little
argument about the value of the cross-undertaking in damages, and there are
freely available methods of security.'21
Megarry V.C. in Barclay-Johnson v. YuilI' 22 cited Allen with ap-
proval.123 After pointing out that the case before him was "in some respects
commercial in nature,"' 24 the Vice Chancellor remarked that it was not the
usual "sort of case that finds its way into the Commercial Court."'125 Given
the purpose of the jurisdiction, "to prevent judgments of the court from
being rendered ineffective by the removal of the defendant's assets from the
jurisdiction,"' 2 6 Megarry V.C. saw no basis upon which to confine it to
commercial cases.
From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the courts have em-
ployed the Mareva injunction in a wide variety of circumstances and that
few limitations have been imposed on the availability of this important new
prejudgment remedy. One significant restriction, however, has gained the
approval of the House of Lords. In Siskina (Cargo owners) v. Distos Com-
pania Naviera SA, 127 a group of cargo owners sought leave to issue a writ
for service ex juris against the owner of the ship upon which their cargoes
had been loaded. The plaintiffs claimed damages for breach of duty and an
injunction to restrain the defendant from disposing of certain insurance
monies payable to it by Lloyd's of London. The monies represented the
defendant's only asset. The issue for the Law Lords to decide was whether a
Mareva injunction could issue in a case where the court had no jurisdiction
over the defendant, because the defendant could not be served in England,
and where the plaintiff's cause of action did not fall within the terms of
Order 11 of the 1965 English Rules of the Supreme Court, the equivalent
to Rule 25 of the Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice.
128
120 24 & 25 Eliz. II, c. 30.
12 lSupra note 61, at 1258 (W.L.R.), 506 (All E.R.).
122 Supra note 61.
123 Id. at 1267 (W.L.R.), 197 (All E.R.).
124 Id. at 1267 (W.L.R.), 196 (All E.R.).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1267 (W.L.R.), 197 (All E.R.).
127 Supra note 61.
128R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 540.
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The Court of Appeal had concluded that Order 11, Rule 1(1) (i), of
the 1965 English Rules of the Supreme Court permitted service ex juris in
any case where there is a "genuine claim for an injunction,' 29 even though
the cause of action did not otherwise comply with Order 11. Order 11, Rule
1 (1) (i), states as follows:
1.-(l) ... service of a writ, or notice of a writ, out of the jurisdiction is per-
missible with the leave of the Court in the following cases, that is to say
(i) if in the action begun by the writ an injunction is sought ordering the
defendant to do or refrain from doing anything within the jurisdiction
(whether or not damages are also claimed in respect of a failure to do or
the doing of that thing);... 130
On appeal to the House of Lords, the decision of the Court of Appeal was
reversed. Lord Diplock was of the opinion that, in order for an English
court to assume jurisdiction over a foreign defendant pursuant to Order 11,
Rule 1(1) (i), the underlying claim must be one that is justiciable in
England:
To argue that the claim to monetary compensation is justiciable in the High
Court because if it were justiciable it would give rise to an ancillary right to a
Mareva injunction restraining the shipowners doing something in England pend-
ing adjudication of the monetary claim, appears to me to involve the fallacy of
petitio principii or, in the vernacular, an attempt to pull oneself up by one's own
bootstraps.13 1
The decision in the Siskina case, then, has sounded the death-knell for the
establishment of a general quasi in rem jurisdiction similar to that exercised
in most jurisdictions in the United States. 3 2 The mere fact that there is pro-
perty in the jurisdiction, the transfer of which may be enjoined, does not
provide a basis for an English court to acquire jurisdiction over the Iis.
C. Matters Ancillary to the Mareva Injunction Jurisdiction
In the six years since the Mareva injunction made its first appearance,
the English courts have been called upon to deal with a host of ancillary
129 [1979] A.C. 210 at 238, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 532 at 556, [1977] 3 All E.R. 803 at
816, per Lawton L.J.
130R. 25(1)(i) of the Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice, R.R.O. 1980,
Reg. 540, provides as follows:
25(1) Subject to rule 795, a party to an action or proceeding may be served out
of Ontario as provided by rule 26 where the action or proceeding as against that
party consists of a claim or claims...
(i) for an injunction in respect of anything done, being done or to be done within
Ontario;...
131Supra note 61, at 257 (A.C.), 825-26 (W.L.R.), 825 (All E.R.), 6 (Lloyd's
Rep.) per Diplock LJ.
132 Prejudgment remedies, including prejudgment attachment, have been under
attack in recent years in the United States. The United States Supreme Court, in four
somewhat contradictory decisions, has examined the constitutionality of a variety of
prejudgment remedies: see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Pay View 395 U.S.
337; 89 S. Ct. 1820 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 416 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974); North Georgia
Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem. Inc. 419 U.S. 601, 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
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matters. In this section, some of these matters will be discussed. Attention
will be turned to: (1) Mareva injunctions and priorities among creditors;
(2) Mareva injunctions and discovery; (3) variation of Mareva injunctions;
and (4) Mareva injunctions and costs.
1. Priorities Among Creditors
What rights, if any, does a creditor who has succeeded in securing a
Mareva injunction have in the property frozen thereby? This question was
answered early on in the development of the remedy. In Cretanor Maritime
Co. Ltd. v. Irish Marine Mngt. Ltd.,133 the Court was called upon to deter-
mine the respective rights of a plaintiff having the benefit of a Mareva in-
junction and a debenture holder. Buckley L.J. drew the following distinctions
between a Mareva injunction and an attachment:
"Attachment" must, I apprehend, mean a seizure of assets under some writ or
like command or order of a competent authority, normally with a view to their
being either realised to meet an established claim or held as a pledge or security
for the discharge of some claim either already established or yet to be established.
An attachment must fasten on particular assets. They need not, I think, be parti-
cularised in the writ or order under which the attachment is effected, but the
attachment of a particular asset cannot take place unless and until it has in some
manner fastened upon that asset. A Mareva injunction, however, even if it re-
lates only to a particularised asset... is relief in personam. It does not effect a
seizure of any asset. It merely restrains the owner from dealing with the asset in
certain ways. The asset... might be said to have been in a sense arrested, but
only in a loose sense. All that the injunction achieves is in truth to prohibit the
owner from doing certain things in relation to the asset. It is consequently, in my
judgment, not strictly accurate to refer to a Mareva injunction as a pre-trial
attachment.lM
As a result, Buckley L.J. held that a Mareva injunction must give way to
the prior rights of the debenture holders to the fund in question.
Consistent with this ruling of Buckley L.J. the, courts, on a number of
occasions, have permitted a defendant subject to a Mareva injunction to deal
with his assets in the ordinary course of business, for example, to pay debts
owed to other creditors. This was the case in Iraqi Ministry of Defence v.
Arcepey Shipping Co. SA, 35 where Goff J. concluded that the payment of
debts with assets frozen by a Mareva injunction did not conflict with the
purpose of this prejudgment remedy: to prevent the defendant from causing
his assets to be removed from the jurisdiction in order to avoid the risk of
having to satisfy any judgment eventually rendered against it.Y36
2. Discovery
To ensure the effectiveness of a Mareva injunction, and its equitable
enforcement, the English courts have concluded that it may be necessary in
133 Supra note 61.
134Id. at 974 (W.L.R.), 170 (All E.R.), 429-30 (Lloyd's Rep.).
1
3 5 Supra note 61. See also A. v. C. (No. 2), supra note 60.
1361d. at 494 (W.L.R.), 485 (All E.R.), 636 (Lloyd's Rep.).
1981]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
some cases to allow the plaintiff to discover the defendant at a very early
stage in the litigation. Robert Goff J. in A. v. C. described a variety of
circumstances in which early discovery may be necessary:
Now the exercise of this jurisdiction may lead to many problems. The defen-
dant may have more than one asset within the jurisdiction, for example, he may
have a number of bank accounts. The plaintiff does not know how much, if
anything, is in any of them; nor does each of the defendant's bankers know what
is in the other accounts. Without information about the state of each account it
is difficult, if not impossible, to operate the Mareva jurisdiction properly; for
example, if each banker prevents any drawing from his account to the limit
of the sum claimed, the defendant will be treated oppressively, and the plaintiff
may be held liable on his undertaking in damages. Again, there may be a single
claim against a number of defendants: in that event the same difficulties may
arise. Furthermore, the very generality of the order creates difficulty for the de-
fendant's bankers, who may for example be unaware of the existence of other
assets of the defendant within the jurisdiction; indeed, if a more specific order
is possible, it may give much needed protection for the defendant's bankers, who
are after all simply the innocent holders of one form of the defendant's assets.18 7
His Lordship was of the opinion that the courts had the power to order such
discovery under the 1965 English Rules of the Supreme Court,'88 section
45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925139 and,
in appropriate circumstances, section 7 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act
1879.140 Insofar as the rights of the defendant were concerned, Goff J. re-
jected the defendant's submission that early discovery of the sort urged upon
the Court by the plaintiff would be "an unwarranted invasion of the defend-
ant's private affairs.' 141 He stated that the defendant's interest in maintain-
ing his privacy was outweighed by "the desirability of interrogatories in
circumstances where it is necessary to do so for the proper exercise of the
Mareva jurisdiction.' 142 Otherwise, the Mareva jurisdiction might be ren-
dered ineffective, "for a plaintiff, faced with lack of knowledge of the value
of a specified asset ... may ... be deterred from giving his undertaking in
damages with the result that he is unable to obtain the relief.' 43
The Court of Appeal in A.J. Bekhor & Co. Ltd. v. Bilton,144 however,
drew some limitations on the courts' power to order discovery in aid of a
Mareva injunction. The plaintiff in the Bilton case, believing that the defend-
ant had failed to disclose all his assets, applied for and was granted an order
compelling the defendant to swear an affidavit outlining his assets and serve
it on the plaintiff. On appeal, however, the English Court of Appeal over-
137 Supra note 61, at 632-33 (W.L.R.), 351 (All E.R.).
18 Id. The Court suggested early discovery may be available under Ord. 24, r. 7,
and Ord. 26 r. 1.
139 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 49, s. 45(1).
14042 & 43 Vict. c. 11, s. 7. For the equivalent provision in Ontario, see the
Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 145, s. 33.
141 Supra note 61, at 633 (W.L.R.), 352 (All E.R.).
1421d.
143 ld.
144 Supra note 61.
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turned the original order. Concluding that section 45(1) of the Supreme
Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 19251 included a power to make
ancillary orders to ensure the effectiveness of a Mareva injunction, the Court
held that the plaintiff should have applied for the cross-examination of the
defendant on his earlier affidavit or for the withdrawal of the order obtained
without full disclosure.146 Given these alternatives open to the plaintiff, the
Court was of the opinion that it was not proper to introduce new machinery
unnecessary for the proper operation of the Mareva jurisdiction.147
3. Power to Vary
In the last few years, the courts in England have acknowledged that,
in appropriate circumstances, a Mareva injunction may be varied. This may
be necessary, for example, "to allow a transfer of assets by the defendant if
the defendant satisfies the court that he requires the money for a purpose
which does not conflict with the policy underlying the Mareva jurisdic-
tion,' '1 48 as was the case in Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping
Co. S.A.149
4. Mareva Injunction and Costs
The English courts to date have considered two costs related issues
arising out of their Mareva injunction jurisdiction. There has been some
discussion whether the value of the assets frozen by a Mareva injunction
should reflect any costs that are likely to be awarded to the plaintiff if he
succeeds in his action against the defendant. In addition, the courts in recent
cases have dealt with the question whether a plaintiff applying for Mareva
injunction relief should be required to provide an undertaking with respect
to the costs incurred by a person, other than the defendant, bound by the
injunction.
145 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 49, s. 45(1).
140 Supra note 61, at 618-19, per Ackner L.J.
14 7 The Court in this case was badly divided. There was general agreement that the
courts had an inherent jurisdiction under s. 45 to make an order for discovery to ensure
the efficacy of a Mareva injunction. Ackner L.J. was of the view that, in the circum-
stances, the plaintiff could not obtain discovery of the defendant under the Rules of the
Supreme Court. Nor could a court require the defendant to submit an affidavit of his
assets for the purposes of effectuating a Mareva injunction (at 613-14).
Griffiths L.J. also concluded that the Rules of the Supreme Court did not empower
the court to make the order in question. But, in his opinion, s. 45 did support an order
requiring the defendant to file an affidavit of his assets (at 624).
Stephenson L.J. agreed that the Rules of the Supreme Court did not assist the
plaintiff in this case. His Lordship, seemed to suggest that the power to grant discovery
in aid of a Mareva injunction was based on the inherent jurisdiction of the courts (at
626). This position was rejected by Ackner L.J. (at 617), and Griffiths L.J. expressed
no view on it. Stephenson L.J., however, concluded that the order of the judge at first
instance went beyond the legitimate purposes of an order for discovery in aid of a
Mareva injunction (at 628).
148 See A. v. C. (No. 2), supra note 61, at 635 (W.L.R.), 127 (All E.R.).
149 Supra note 61.
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The first question was addressed briefly by Megarry V.C. in Barclay-
Johnson v. Yuill.15 The plaintiff in this case sought a Mareva injunction to
protect her £2,000 claim against the defendant. The asset that the plaintiff
sought to freeze was the defendant's bank account in the amount of £3,300.
The Vice Chancellor, although he issued a Mareva injunction, did not think
that it "would be right to continue the injunction against the whole of the
£3,300"'u r in these circumstances. He did intimate, however, that the
amount in the defandant's bank account sterilized by the Mareva injunction
should be £2,000 and an allowance for "a reasonable sum for costs."' 5 2
This position would seem to be entirely consistent with the principle under-
lying the Mareva injunction jurisdiction, to minimize "the risk of the defend-
ant removing his assets from the jurisdiction and so stultifying any judgment
given by the courts in the action,"153 since costs may well form part of the
judgment eventually secured by the plaintiff.
On the second issue, whether a person seeking Mareva injunction relief
should be required to give an undertaking respecting the costs that might be
incurred by a third party complying with such an injunction, the courts again
have adopted a very practical approach. An example of this is the case
of Searose Ltd. v. Seatrain (U.K.) Ltd.,164 where a Mareva injunction in
respect of the defendant's bank account was requested. Goff J. described
the costs problem associated with the freezing of bank accounts in the fol-
lowing terms:
... as Mareva injunctions have come to be granted more frequently, the banks
in this country have received numerous notices of injunctions which have been
granted. Sometimes the injunction identifies the bank account in question;, some-
times it identifies the branch of a bank at which the defendant is said to have
a bank account; sometimes it identifies the bank and no more; sometimes it does
not even identify the bank. Now, where the particular account is identified I do
not think the bank can reasonably complain. Every citizen of this country who
receives notice of an injunction granted by the court will risk proceedings for
contempt of court if he acts inconsistently with the injunction; and the bank,
like any other citizen, must avoid any such action. But where the particular ac-
count is not identified the situation is somewhat different. I do not think it is
right that the bank should incur expense in ascertaining whether the alleged ac-
count exists, without being reimbursed by the plaintiff for any reasonable costs
incurred. Banks are not debt-collecting agencies; they are simply, in this context,
citizens who are anxious not to contravene an order made by the court, an order
which has been obtained on the application of, and for the benefit of, the plain-
tiff. Even where the particular branch of the bank is identified, some expense is
likely to be incurred in ascertaining whether the defendant has an account at
the branch. But where the branch is not identified the bank will be put in a very
difficult position. It is, I think, well known that Barclays Bank has over 3,000
branches in this country, and Lloyds Bank has over 2,000 branches. Are they to
circulate all their branches? If they did so, it would involve them in great ex-
150 Supra note 61.
151 Id. at 1267 (W.L.R.), 196 (All E.R.).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1264 (W.L.R.), 194 (All E.R.).
154 Supra note 61. See also Clipper Maritime Co. v. Mineralimportexport, [1981],
1 W.L.R. 1262 (Q.B.).
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pense; moreover such an exercise cannot, in ordinary circumstances, reasonably
be expected of them.' 55
The solution proposed by his Lordship to this problem was to allow "a bank
to whom notice of an injunction is given. . . before taking steps to ascertain
whether the defendant has an account at any particular branch, [to] obtain
an undertaking from the plaintiff's solicitors to pay their reasonable costs
incurred in so doing."'150 The benefits of this solution, Goff J. stated, would
be that "[t]he bank will then be protected; moreover the plaintiff's solicitors
will no doubt be encouraged to limit their inquiry to a particular branch, or
to certain particular branches."'1 57 For purposes of clarification, Mr. Justice
Goff added that the undertaking under discussion would be for the protec-
tion of persons "other than the defendant himself."'' 5 8
On a cautionary note, Goff J. referred to the courts' need to protect the
interests, not only of the party applying for a Mareva injunction, but also of
the defendant and third parties:
... care must be taken to ensure that such injunctions are only given for the pur-
pose for which they are intended, viz. to prevent the possible abuse of the de-
fendant removing assets in order to prevent the satisfaction of a judgment in
pending proceedings; and likewise care must be taken to ensure that such in-
junctions do not bear harshly on innocent third parties. If these principles are not
observed, a weapon which was forged to prevent abuse may become an instru-
ment of oppression. 159
To ensure that these competing interests are properly balanced, his Lordship
enunciated the following principles:
It follows that, first, an order for a Mareva injunction should not be sought
in terms wider than are reasonably required in the circumstances of the case.
Second, any asset in respect of which an order for Mareva injunction is sought
should be identified with as much precision as is reasonably practicable. Third,
as regards any asset to which the order applies but which has not been identified
with precision in the form of order proposed (eg money held in an unidentified
bank account), the plaintiff may be required to give an undertaking to pay rea-
sonable costs incurred by any person (other than the defendant) to whom notice
of the terms of the injunction is given in ascertaining whether or not any asset
to which the order applies, but which has not been identified in it, is within his
possession or control.160
IV. THE MAREVA INJUNCTION: THE COMMONWEALTH
EXPERIENCE
A. The Canadian Cases
After a somewhat rocky start in Canada, the Mareva injunction seems
to have taken root in this country. There would still appear to be some
uncertainty, however, about this remedy on the part of a few courts, and
'55 Id. at 807.
156 Id.
167 Id.
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this uncertainty is evident in the case law. Canadian courts, on the whole,
seem somewhat reluctant to give this significant prejudgment remedy the
scope that it has been given by courts in other jurisdictions, particularly in
the United Kingdom. This section of the paper will examine the decisions
of the Canadian courts and point out the courts' ambivalence about arming
claimants with what is clearly a highly potent weapon.
The first Ontario case to advert to the Mareva injunction question was
Robert Reiser & Co. v. Nadore Food Processing Equipment Ltd.161 There
Mr. Justice Steele, without relying on the trilogy of English cases that gave
birth to the Mareva injunction, granted the application of the plaintiff to
continue until trial an ex parte injunction restraining the defendants from
disposing of certain property.
In Robert Reiser, the plaintiff's action was for money owing by the
defendant as the maker of two promissory notes held by the plaintiff. In
addition, the plaintiff sought to set aside a conveyance of property by the
defendant to a third party, a related company. Steele J., citing the old case of
Campbell v. Campbell'1 and the more recent decision of City of Toronto
v. McIntosh,163 concluded that an injunction, like the one sought by the
plaintiff, could be granted if the court is satisfied "that there is a strong indi-
cation that the conveyance may have been fraudulent"164 A "conviction or
prior finding of fraud"'165 was not necessary in order to come within the
principles enunciated by the Court in Campbell v. Campbell.
Two other aspects of this decision are significant. First, in determining
whether to grant the injunction requested in the case before him, Steele J.
applied the principles for the granting of an interlocutory injunction outlined
by the Divisional Court in Yule Inc. v. Atlantic Pizza Delight Franchise
(1968) Ltd. 60 There the Court accepted the principles pronounced by the
House of Lords in the seminal case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon,
Ltd. 67 In other words, in this respect an injunction to restrain a defendant
from disposing of his assets before trial is to be treated like any other in-
161 (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 717, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 278, 25 C.B.R. (N.S.) 162 (H.CJ.).
162 (1881), 29 Gr. 252.
163 (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 257 (H.C.J.).
'
64 Supra note 161, at 719 (O.R.), 280 (D.L.R.), 165 (C.B.R.). For some early
cases concerning this particular jurisdiction, see e.g., Fairchild v. Elmsie (1909), 2 Alta.
L.R. 115 (S.C.); Pacific Investment Co. v. Swan (1898), 3 Terr. L.R. 125 (C.A.);
Bank of Montreal v. Pelletier (1923), 19 Alta. L.R. 756, [1923] 3 W.W.R. 735, [1923]
4 D.L.R. 706 (C.A.); Winnipeg Paint & Glass Co. v. Lackman, [1923] 3 W.W.R. 361
(Man. K.B.); Albertson v. Secord (1912), 4 Alta. L.R. 90, 1 W.W.R. 657, 1 D.L.R. 804
(C.A.); Clinton v. Sellars (1907), 1 Alta. L.R. 129, 6 W.L.R. 788 (S.C.); Toronto
Carpet Co. v. Wright (1912), 22 Man. R. 294, 21 W.L.R. 304, 3 D.L.R. 725 (K.B.);
Bassi v. Sullivan (1914), 32 O.L.R. 14, 18 D.L.R. 452 (H.C. Div.).
165 Id.
166 (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 505 at 510-12, 80 D.L.R. (3d) 725 at 730-32, 35 C.P.R.
(2d) 273 at 279-80.
167 [1975] A.C. 396, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 316, [1975] 1 All E.R. 504 (H.L:). See
Sharpe, supra note 95.
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junction.168 Second, it is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Steele amended
the terms of the ex parte injunction granted by Van Camp J. to permit the
property or goods in question to be sold in the "normal course of busi-
ness."' 09 "[P]roceeds from any such sale," he ordered, "must be held in a
special trust account to the credit of this action.' 70 It will be recalled that
the English Court of Appeal in Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Ship-
ping Co. SA171 came to a similar conclusion. In Arcepey, a Mareva injunc-
tion had been granted.
The first setback that the Mareva injunction jurisdiction suffered in this
country'was in the case of OSF Ind. Ltd. v. Marc-Jay Inv. Ltd.172 In that
case, Lerner J. denied the plaintiff's ex parte application for an injunction to
enjoin the defendant from removing its assets from Ontario pending the
determination of the action on the ground that there was no basis in law for
the remedy sought. The plaintiff's application in the OSF Ind. case would
seem to have been a purely prophylactic measure; in other words, it does not
appear that the defendant had entered into any questionable transactions
of its property. The plaintiff's concern, as stated by Mr. Justice Lerner, was
.,. that in the event that the defendant [a non-resident corporation not carrying
on business in Ontario] receives notice of this action,... it may remove its assets
out of Ontario pending the determination of the action and that there may be no
assets with which to satisfy any judgment which the plaintiff may obtain.178
In dismissing the plaintiff's application, Lerner J. stated that a creditor,
before he has secured a judgment against his debtor, "has no right at law or
in equity capable of being protected by an interlocutory injunction."' 74 It
would appear that his Lordship believed that he was bound by the decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedell v. Gefaell (No. 2)175 where a similar
request for injunctive relief also was turned down. The judgment of Lerner J.
makes only a passing reference to the Karageorgis case and it would appear
that counsel for the plaintiff did not cite to his Lordship the other English
18 There would appear to be some difference of opinion on whether the proper test
to be applied in the Mareva context is that enunciated by the House of Lords in the
American Cyanamid case. For example, Tallis J. in B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd.
v. Hunt, [1981] 1 W.W.R. 209 at 240, (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) at 58, 16 C.P.C. 168
at 181 (N.W.T.S.C.) also referred to this test. Grange J. in Canadian Pacific Airlines
Ltd. v. Hind (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 591 at 596, 122 D.L.R. (3d) 498 at 503 (H.C.J.)
rejected it commenting:
The adoption of 'the Mareva principle can lead to some sorry abuse. I would hate
to see a defendant's assets tied up merely because he was involved in litigation.
I do not think the American Cyanamid injunction rule [with its emphasis on the
balance of convenience and with its relegation of a merits test to a subsidiary
role] can possibly apply. There must be a very strong case and a real danger of
disposition of the only assets which will satisfy the judgment.
169 Supra note 161, at 720 (O.R.), 282 (D.L.R.), 166 (C.B.R.).
170 Id.
171 Supra note 61.
172 (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 566, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 446, 7 C.P.C. 57 (H.C.J.).
173 Id. at 567 (O.R.), 446 (D.L.R.), 58 (C.P.C.).
174 Id. at 568 (O.R.), 448 (D.L.R.), 60 (C.P.C.).
175 [1938] O.R. 726, [1938] 4 D.L.R. 443 (C.A.).
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decisions affirming the power of the courts to grant a Mareva injunction in
appropriate circumstances. With the exception of some minor judicial rum-
blings, the issue of whether Canadian courts could grant a Mareva injunction
remained dormant for another two years.
In 1979, Eberle L in Provincial Bank of Canada v. Supreme Seat Dist.
Ltd.17 without citing any authority, did agree to continue an injunction re-
straining the defendant company from dealing with a large sum of money
on deposit in its bank account. The monies were realized on the sale of
certain shares of the defendant company that were covered by a security
agreement in favour of the plaintiff bank. Mr. Justice Eberle described the
actions of the defendant company in the following unflattering terms:
What happened... was that, while the company was writing cheques against its
account at the plaintiff bank, an account which was in overdraft, money collected
by the company [in breach of the security agreement] was being deposited in an
account in the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. This at the very best was
a low degree of commercial morality. Ordinary business relations, including the
borrowing and lending of money, depend to a great extent on the honesty of the
parties involved, and it appears on the material before me that such honesty on
the part of the defendants is lacking.1 77
The defendant company had acted suspiciously in a number of other ways
as well, including vacating the premises it occupied, moving its assets to
another location and moving its head office. In response to the defendant's
argument that the injunction, if continued, would create a hardship for the
defendant company, possibly resulting in bankruptcy and unemployment for
its employees, Mr. Justice Eberle simply stated that although the "freeze"
on its account would undoubtedly be a hardship, the case was nevertheless
a proper one for an injunction.178
The judgment of Eberle J. in Supreme Seat should be contrasted with
the judgment of Hamilton J. in Hawes v. Szewczyk, 179 a Manitoba case
decided at approximately the same time. There the plaintiffs were seeking an
injunction to prevent the defendant from "selling, disposing, mortgaging, or
encumbering in any manner, any property and/or, assets [in] which he has a
legal or equitable interest or to which he is entitled, pending the conclusion
of-this case."' 80 The plaintiffs argued that the issue of liability was clear and
that an eventual judgment would be substantial. Hamilton J. denied the
plaintiffs' request on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction in the
circumstances of the case to grant the relief sought by them. He observed
that, in his opinion, the course of action advocated by the plaintiffs "would
be a dangerous innovation, and even if technically within the jurisdiction
of the court, one that should not be exercised.' u81 He went on to state that
to grant an injunction in a case other than one in which the plaintiff had
176 Unreported, July 30, 1979 (Ont. H.C.J.).
.17 Id. at 2.
178 Id. at 3.
179 Unreported, April 18, 1979 (Man. Q.B.).
1S0ld. at 1.
181 Id, at 5-6.
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"established his or her claim by due process of law"182 would be unjust and,
therefore, contrary to the spirit and intent of The Queen's Bench Act, 183 the
equivalent to section 19(1) of the Ontario Judicature Act 84 and section
45(1) of the English Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act,
1925.185 Hamilton J., however, seemed to leave open the possibility of an
injunction being granted under section 59(3) of The Queen's Bench Act in
a case where it could be shown that the defendant was about to remove his
property from the province or to deal with it with the intent to delay, defeat
or defraud creditors. 186 Section 59(3) is equivalent to that part of section
19 (1) of the Ontario Judicature Act concerned with the use of an injunction
"to prevent any threatened or apprehended waste or trespass."
Although the issue is far from being resolved in an entirely satisfac-
tory manner, with favourable decisions in Ontario, the Northwest Terri-
tories and in the Federal Court of Canada, it would seem that Mareva
injunctions may be granted in this country in certain circumstances.
Considering first the narrowest interpretation of this recent spate of deci-
sions, it may be argued, for example, that the power of the courts to
grant prejudgment injunctive relief to restrain the defendant from dealing
with his assets is limited to cases involving fraud or a fraudulent conveyance.
Mills and Mills v. Petrovic'87 and Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. Hind,188
both decisions of a judge of the Ontario High Court of Justice, fall into the
fraud category. The cases of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v.
Nielsen89 and Bank of Montreal v. Page Properties Ltd. 90 are of the
fraudulent conveyance variety. The decision of the Federal Court of Canada
can be dismissed because the views of Collier J. on the availability of a
Mareva injunction were obiter: Mr. Justice Collier declined to accept juris-
diction in Elesguro Inc. v. Ssangyong Shipping Co.'91 on the ground of
forum non conveniens.
182 Id. at 6.
183 R.S.M. 1970, c. C280.
'
84 R.S.O. 1980, c. 223.
185 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 49.
180 59(3) Where, either before, or at, or after, the hearing of any cause or matter,
an application is made for an injunction to prevent any threatened or
apprehended waste or trespass, the injunction may be granted, if the
court thinks fit, whether the person against whom the injunction is sought
is, or is not, in possession under any claim of title or otherwise, or (if
out of possession) does or does not claim a right to do the act sought
to be restrained under any colour of title, and whether the estates
claimed by both or by either of the parties are legal or equitable.
187 (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 238, 118 D.L.R. (3d) 367.
188 Supra note 168.
189 Unreported, Apr. 2, 1981 (Ont. H.C.J.). See also Canpotex Ltd. v. Graham,
unreported Feb. 5, 1982 (Ont. H.C.J.).
190 (1980), 15 R.P.R. 108 (Ont. H.C.J.), rev'd (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 9 (Div. Ct.).
See also C.D.N. Research and Development Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 32
O.R. (2d) 579, 122 D.L.R. (3d) 485 (H.C.J.). Leave to appeal to the Ont. Div. Ct.
has been granted.
19' (1980), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 105 (F.C.T.D.).
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Unfortunately, this "worst case scenario" does not take account of the
decisions of Montgomery J. in Liberty National Bank and Trust Co. v.
Atkin,192 and of Tallis J. of the Northwest Territories Supreme Court in
B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt.193 In Atkin, the plaintiff sought
to restrain the defendants from dealing with a certain term deposit held by a
local trust company. The monies in the term deposit were totally uncon-
nected with the action brought by the plaintiff. The basis for the claim for a
Mareva injunction was certain evidence that led "to the inescapable conclu-
sion that a systematic liquidation of assets is being made for other than
business purposes.' 19 4
Mr. Justice Montgomery, in granting the plaintiff's application for in-
junctive relief, reviewed the more important English decisions concerned
with the jurisdiction to issue a Mareva injunction. Nowhere in his judgment
are the words "fraud" or "fraudulent conveyance" mentioned. His conclud-
ing remarks should leave little doubt about Mr. Justice Montgomery's attrac-
tion to the Mareva injunction.
In my view, the winds of change cry out for the new equitable remedy that
Mareva provides. I adopt the test laid down by the Master of the Rolls in Third
Chandris Shipping. I also adopt the proposition in Prince Abdul Rahman that, if
there is a danger of the defendant absconding or of the assets being removed
out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction, or otherwise dealt
with so that if the plaintiff obtains judgment he may not be able to have it satis-
fied, an injunction should issue if the safeguards in the test in Third Chandris
Shipping are met.
I cannot believe that the equitable jurisdiction of this Court should be any
less than that of the English Court. The statute affording jurisdiction is practi-
cally the same. The size of Ontario and the complexity of its geography invite
the remedy. In my view, the doctrine should not be restricted to the threat of re-
moval of assets from Ontario.' 0 5
Also of interest in this case is the fact that the injunction granted was for
$80,000; that is, $80,000 of the $155,000 term deposit in question was
required to be held until trial or other disposition of the action "to cover
claim and costs."'96 The amount in dispute was only $75,000. Mr. Justice
Montgomery also observed that, insofar as prejudgment interest was con-
cerned, "[a]ny interest that the Court may see fit to award.., should be
sufficiently protected by the interest yield on the $80,000 held by Canada
Trust."197
Equally as significant as the judgment of Montgomery J. in Liberty
National Bank and Trust Company v. A tkin, is the decision of Tallis J. in
B.P. Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt, a case involving a series
of attempts to enforce a foreign judgment. What is worth pointing out, how-
192 (1981), 31 O.R. (2d) 715 (H.C.).
193 Supra note 168.
194 Supra note 192, at 717.
195 Id. at 723.
-190 d. at 724 [Emphasis added].
197 Id.
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ever, is that this litigation has given birth to a number of Mareva injunction
applications, including the one under discussion. 98
The submissions of the defendant in B.P. Exploration Company (Libya)
Ltd. v. Hunt were straightforward: that Mareva injunction remedies were
not consistent with the law of the North West Territories, and that the facts
did not warrant a Mareva injunction, even if it were available as a remedy.199
After a lengthy review of the Canadian and English authorities on point,
Tallis J. concluded that the Court did have "jurisdiction to issue a Mareva
type injunction. ' '20° In so holding, his Lordship rejected the defendant's
contention that a Mareva injunction was inconsistent with the rules of court
dealing with absconding debtors. He stated the opinion that "such provisions
do not deprive this court of granting a Mareva type injunction."20'
In dealing with the defendant's submission that a Mareva injunction
should not have been granted in the circumstances of the case, Tallis J., as
did Montgomery J. in the Atkin case, referred to the guidelines enunciated
by Lord Denning M.R. in Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA,
and found these guidelines to be satisfied. Yet, on the material before him,
the only real evidence establishing a risk of assets being removed before the
judgment was satisfied was the following: the defendant had "the means and
capability to organize his business affairs in a sophisticated manner so as to
prevent his assets being available to satisf3i a judgment; 202 the defendant
gave no indication "as to his future intentions which would allay the fears
of the Plaintiff that he would alienate his assets,'120 3 nor did he proffer any
undertaking or security; the defendant, in each jurisdiction in which a Mareva
injunction was granted, took action "to set it aside rather than leave matters
in the status quo pending the hearing of an appeal in the English Court of
Appeal"; -20 4 and the defendant "made considerable efforts to evade serv-
ice '205 in respect of the proceedings in England.
B. The Mareva Injunction in Other Commonwealth Jurisdictions
The Mareva injunction has been employed more extensively in other
Commonwealth jurisdictions. The focus of the present discussion will be on
the response of the courts in Australia and New Zealand to this innovative
prejudgment remedy.
Those few cases in which the Mareva injunction jurisdiction has been
198 See, for example, Ex parte B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., Re Hunt, [19791
2 N.S.W.L.R. 406 (S.C.) and Hunt v. B.P. Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd., [19801
1 N.Z.L.R. 104 (S.C.), both of which are discussed in Part IV, s. B, infra.
199 Supra note 168, at 214 (W.W.R.), 39 (D.L.R.), 173 (C.P.C.).




o2 Id. at 220 (W.W.R.), 43 (D.L.R.).
203 Id. at 221 (W.W.R.), 43 (D.L.R.).
204 Id. at 221 (W.W.R.), 44 (D.L.R.).
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rejected will be dealt with first. In Pivovaroff v. Chernabaeft,200 the South
Australian Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's application for an injunc-
tion to restrain the defendant, an American resident in Australia, from dis-
posing of his property before the conclusion of the action. As grounds for a
Mareva injunction, the plaintiff pointed to the fact that the defendant's
property was up for sale, and that he was seeking payment in cash. Bray C.J.
decided the case on the narrow ground that, since the defendant was resident
in the jurisdiction, a Mareva injunction could not be granted. As has already
been pointed out, however, the English courts in more recent cases have
concluded that such an injunction may be granted even though the defendant
is resident in the United Kingdom. 207
Although he dismissed the plaintiff's request on the narrow grounds
mentioned above, Bray CJ. went on to give his views on the propriety of the
courts' assuming the jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction. It was his
view that the introduction of Mareva injunctions was properly a matter for
the legislature rather than the courts,208 and he buttressed this argument by
pointing to the legislation permitting a court to order the arrest of an ab-
sconding debtor.209 This same argument, it will be recalled, was raised by the
defendant in B.P. Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt, and rejected
summarily by Tallis J.2-1
Courts in the Australian states of New South Wales, Victoria and West-
ern Australia and in New Zealand, on the other hand, have expressed their
approval of Mareva injunctions. In Praznovsky v. Sablyack,211 the plaintiffs
claimed to be entitled to damages from the defendant on the basis of her
participation in a conspiracy to steal their jewellery and money. The Supreme
Court of Victoria concluded that the plaintiffs, having established a prima
facie case against the defendant, were entitled to prejudgment relief in the
form of a Mareva injunction: they ran an "appreciable risk that the defend-
ant, if not restrained, may disappear with the proceeds of sale before her
trial and that plaintiffs' action against her will prove fruitless. 212
In J.D. Barry Pty. Ltd. v. M. & E. Constructions Pty. Ltd.,213 Lush J.
of the Supreme Court of Victoria denied the plaintiff's motion for a Mareva
injunction, however, without doubting the jurisdiction of the Court in appro-
priate circumstances to grant such relief. Lush J. concluded that, on the
material before him, the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case.2 14
206 (1978), 16 S.A.S.R. 329.
2 07 See discussion Part 1II, s. B, supra.
2 0S Supra note 206, at 338.
201 Id. at 340.
210 See also Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. v. D.C. Commodities (A'asia) Ply. Ltd.,
[19801 W.A.R. 51 (S.C.).
211 [19771 V.R. 114 (S.C.).
212 Id. at 120.
213 [1978] V.R. 185.
214 Id. at 189.
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Moreover, his Lordship was not satisfied that there was reason to believe
that the defendant could not or would not pay its debt if judgment went
against it. In this regard, Lush J. commented:
... the danger felt is that if this money comes into the hands of the first defen-
dant it will simply disappear in the expenses and perhaps even the losses of con-
ducting the first defendant's business. In my opinion this is an entirely different
situation from the situations dealt with in the three cases to which I have referr-
ed. They in fact all dealt with a threat to remove money from the jurisdiction
or with the fear that money might be removed from the jurisdiction. It is neither
necessary nor desirable for me to express in this case any opinion whether the
rule is limited to the removal of money from the jurisdiction. Be that as it may,
all three cases were concerned with a fear that something might be done which
could be described as disposing of assets with the effect of placing them out of
the reach of the plaintiff. In my opinion the disappearance which the plaintiff
fears in this case of the relevant money in the course of the first defendant's
trade does not come within the concept of disposing of assets with the intention
or with the effect of defeating a claim.2 5
Continuing along the same lines, he added:
If an injunction could be obtained in the present case it would either be entirely
ineffective to benefit the plaintiff, because the money would stand held for the
benefit of creditors generally, or the result would be that a plaintiff could require
a defendant to set up a special fund to meet a debt not yet proved, or again
the effect might be to give the particular plaintiff preference over other business
creditors. No such use of the injunction in relevant circumstances has been point-
ed to and I am unable to take the view that it would be either just or convenient
(Supreme Court Act 1958, s. 62(2)) to make the order sought by the plaintiff
against the first defendant.216
These remarks of Lush J. are consistent with the position adopted by Goff J.
in Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co. SA. 1
Grudging approval was given to the Mareva injunction jurisdiction by
the New South Wales Supreme Court in two recent cases: Balfour William-
son (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Douterluinge218 and Ex parte B.P. Exploration
Co. (Libya) Ltd.; Re Hunt.2 19 In the former, Sheppard J. in a brief judgment
stated that he was bound by the decisions of the English Court of Appeal.22
The plaintiff, having shown that there was a real danger that the defendant
would abscond from the jurisdiction and could take whatever assets he may
have with him, was entitled to a Mareva injunction. This case is but another
example of a Mareva injunction being granted against a resident defendant.
Powell I., although he too believed he was bound by the decisions of the
English Court of Appeal respecting Mareva injunctions, expressed doubts
about the appropriateness of assuming such a jurisdiction in Ex parte B.P.
215 Id. at 188.
216 Id.
2 1 Supra note 61.
218 [1979] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 884.
21 Supra note 198.
22o Supra note 217, at 886.
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Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd.; Re Hunt.221 He stated that he found the rea-
soning of Bray C.J. in Pivovaroff v. Chernabaeff more compelling than that
found in either Praznovsky v. Sablyack or the Western Australian case of
Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. v. D.C. Commodities (A'asia) Pty. Ltd.22 He
also questioned the legitimacy of the courts to grant the type of relief in
question:
So to do would, in my view, fly in the face of the intention of the legislature,
expressed in s. 16(3) (c) of the Supreme Court Act, that, as from the passing of
the Act even the limited form of relief provided by the former "writ of foreign
attachment" should not be available to the plaintiff in such a case.2 23
In any event, Powell I. concluded that the conditions for a Mareva in-
junction were not satisfied in this case. The bases for his holding were as
follows: (1) the evidence did not "support the view that he [the defendant]
is about to remove his assets from the jurisdiction"; 224 (2) the amount which
could be realized upon the disposition of the assets paled "into insignificance
beside the amount of the judgment"; 22 (3) the assets were charged in favour
of a third party who could realize on the assets unimpeded by any injunc-
tion;2 6 and (4) since the defendant was beyond the jurisdiction, "if he chose
to ignore it [the injunction], and chose to remain outside the jurisdiction, it
could not.., be enforced, so that the whole proceeding would be an exer-
cise in futility. '227
The Supreme Court of Western Australia put its imprimatur on the
Mareva injunction in the case of Sanko Steamship Co. v. D.C. Commodities
(A'asia) Pty. Ltd.28 Lavan S.J.P. held that, "having regard to the share
structure of the defendant and its conduct to date it would be unwise to rely
on the statement made by the company that it has no intention of evading
the consequences of any judgment which may be given against it.''220 An in-
junction was, in the circumstances, justified. It is interesting to note that
Lavan S.J.P. found in the plaintiff's favour despite the arguments of the de-
fendant that "[t]he continuation of the injunction could prevent the defend-
ant from fulfilling its contractual commitment and as well as depriving it of
a substantial profit would render it liable to an action for damages as well
as affecting adversely its commercial reputation. '23 0
The last case to be examined in this section is the decision of the New
221 Supra note 198, at 410.





22 Id. at 407.
2 2 8 Supra note 210.
2nId. at 56.
230 Id. at 53.
[VOL. 19, NO. 4
Prejudgment Remedies
Zealand Supreme Court in Hunt v. B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd.,2s1
yet another skirmish in the litigious war being fought by these two parties.
As has already been pointed out, Tallis J. in the Northwest Territories
Supreme Court, granted a Mareva injunction in the Canadian version of this
litigation, while the New South Wales Supreme Court refused to grant such
relief on substantially the same facts. Barker J. in the New Zealand Court,
reviewed the English and Australian authorities, and concluded as follows:
On the one hand, is the Mareva jurisdiction... merely an instance of the
exercise of the Court's general jurisdiction conferred in broad terms by s. 16; or
is the Mareva jurisdiction to be regarded as legislating in an area which should
be left to Parliament?...
I consider that this Court does have a Mareva jurisdiction. I do not accept
the view that this jurisdiction is in the nature of legislating in an area forbidden
to the Courts. I am not impressed by the 'assumption of fearful authority' line
of cases. There appears to have been an old English procedure of 'foreign attach-
ment' which provides a perfectly respectable ancestry for the procedure. The fact
that this procedure accords with that in European countries is, for a New Zealand
Court, a matter of coincidence.
The Court has to approach modern problems with the flexibility of modern
business. In former times, as Lawton L.J. pointed out, it would have been more
difficult for a foreign debtor to take his assets out of the country. Today, vast
sums of money can be transferred from one country to another in a matter of
seconds as a result of a phone call or a telex message. Reputable foreign debtors
of course have nothing to fear; the facts of the reported Mareva cases indicate
that the jurisdiction is wholesome; the sheer number of Mareva injunctions grant-
ed in London indicates that the jurisdiction is fulfilling a need. 232
On the basis of the evidence before him, Barker J. was satisfied that he
should sustain the Mareva injunction outstanding against Hunt. It seems that
his Lordship was particularly impressed by the failure of the defendant to
indicate his willingness to pay if his efforts to defeat the plaintiff's claim were
unsuccessful. An additional factor that seems to have weighed heavily against
Hunt was the fact that the plaintiff had "a judgment, albeit one subject to
appeal.1233 Finally, Barker J. considered as a factor in the plaintiff's favour,
that the injunction originally granted had been varied "to permit the proper
operation of the farm [presumably, owned by Hunt] with a minimum of
inconvenience.."23 4 Consequently, there was "little lasting detriment being
suffered by Mr. Hunt because of the Mareva injunction."2' r
V. SUMMARY
Part II of this paper described the proposals of the Civil Procedure
Revision Committee with respect to five different prejudgment remedies.
231 Supra note 198. The judgment of Barker J. refers to two earlier cases in which
it was held that the New Zealand Supreme Court enjoyed a Mareva injunction jurisdic-
tion: see Mosen v. Donselaar (A 325/75, Wellington Registry, judgment 13 October
1978) and Systems & Programs (N.Z.) Ltd. v. P.R.C. Public Mngt. Services Inc., [1978]
N.Z. Recent Law 264.
232 Id. at 117-18.
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Looking at the provisions concerned with certificates of pending litigation,
orders for preservation of personal property, orders for interim recovery of
personal property, orders setting aside default judgments upon terms and
orders for security for costs, one would be hard pressed to determine why the
Committee's Report was five years in the making. The relevant sections of
the proposed new Judicature Act and pertinent rules of the proposed Rules
are little more than a rehash of the present statutory and procedural pro-
visions. Unfortunately, the Committee in these prejudgment relief areas did
not even find it advisable, for the most part, to codify the case law. While
it is obvious that the Committee has sought to employ "simple language and
terminology" 6 in the new Act and accompanying Rules of Civil Procedure,
there does not appear to be any evidence of any attempt to balance "the
expense to litigants of the prescribed procedures against convenience effi-
ciency and social purpose"237 insofar as the above-mentioned prejudgment
remedies are concerned. How else does one explain the maintenance of a
distinction between real property and personal property in the recommenda-
tions of the Committee? Is there really a need to have separate provisions
concerned with the prejudgment attachment of real property2 8 and the pre-
judgment attachment of personal property by means of a preservation order,20
or an order for interim recovery of personal property?240
The failure to rationalize the five prejudgment remedies discussed in
Part II is evident in other ways as well. The proposals of the Civil Procedure
Revision Committee fail to adopt a consistent approach to a number of im-
portant issues in the area of prejudgment relief. For example, while section
50(4) of the proposed Judicature Act, respecting certificates of pending
litigation, deals expressly with the rights of a person who has suffered
damages as a result of the registration of a certificate or caution "without a
reasonable claim to title to or interest in the land," the Rules concerned with
the setting aside of a default judgment upon terms, and security for costs,
are silent on the remedies, if any, available where these powers have been
abused. Another significant gap in the prejudgment relief provisions advo-
cated by the Committee is the failure to set out the onus of proof resting
on a person seeking any one of the five remedies. Although some may con-
tend that the Committee's silence on this issue is not a serious omission,
the onus of proof is of critical importance to a proper balancing of the
interests of debtors and creditors.
In contrast to the rather weak efforts of the Committee in the area of
prejudgment remedies, in recent years the courts in England, Canada and
other parts of the Commonwealth have created an effective, yet equitable,
prejudgment remedy: the Mareva injunction. The courts, in granting this
236 Report, supra note 1, s. I at 2.
237 Id.
938 Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 223, s. 50.
239 Rule 35.02.
240 Report, supra note 1, s. 51 and Rule 44.
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relief, have been careful to consider the rights of debtors, creditors and third
parties. In the few short years that the jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunc-
tion has been recognized, the courts have addressed a wide variety of im-
portant issues, including the strength of the plaintiff's case necessary to
support a Mareva injunction, the circumstances in which such relief should
be available and the protection to be afforded to a defendant and interested
third parties by means of undertakings given by the plaintiff, and by the
courts' power to vary a Mareva injunction. As stated earlier, the Mareva
injunction is not a panacea. Different considerations, for example, may apply
to relief in the form of security for costs. Many of the questions tackled by
the courts in the last six years in filling out the details of their Mareva in-i
junction jurisdiction, however, are equally relevant to the remedies discussed
in Part II, and should be addressed in the new Judicature Act and Rules
of Civil Procedure.
One can only wonder why the Civil Procedure Revision Committee, in
revising The Judicature Act and the Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of
Practice, chose to ignore the Mareva injunction developments in the common
law world. Given the controversy surrounding Mareva injunctions, it is
surprising that the Committee decided to leave section 19(1) of the Judica-
ture Act 241 basically unchanged. Section 45 of the proposed Judicature Act
reads as follows:
45. The court may grant a mandamus or an injunction or appoint a receiver,
by an interlocutory order, in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just
or convenient so to do. Subject to the rules, any such order may be made either
unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.
This course of action may be usefully contrasted with the reaction to the rise
of the Mareva injunction in New Brunswick, England and Western Aus-
tralia. In New Brunswick, for example, the following provision has been
included in that Province's new rules of procedure:
40.01 A request for an interlocutory injunction or mandatory order, or for
an extension thereof, may be made
(a) before commencement of proceedings, by preliminary motion, and
(b) after commencement of proceedings, by motion, but in the former case,
the request may be granted only on terms providing for commencement
of proceedings without delay.
40.02(1) Subject to section 34 of the Judicature Act, where a motion under
Rule 40.01 is made without notice, an injunction may be granted for a period not
exceeding 10 days.
(2) Subject to paragraph (3), a motion to extend an injunction may be made
only on notice to all parties affected by the order sought.
241 R.S.O. 1980, c. 223. It should be noted that Ontario courts are given power
under the Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, s. 22, to "make such interim
or final order as it considers necessary for restraining the disposition or wasting of
assets that would impair or defeat the claim or order for the payment of support." It
is now questionable whether this power can be exercised by a provincial court (family
division): see Reference Re Section 6 of the Family Relations Act, 1978, unreported,
Jan. 26, 1982 (S.C.C.).
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(3) Where
(a) a party evades service of a notice of motion to extend an injunction, or
(b) service of a notice of motion to extend an injunction has not been ef-
fected on all parties and, because of exceptional circumstances, the in-
junction ought to be extended,
the court may extend the injunction, but each extension shall be limited to a
period not exceeding an additional 30 days.
40.03(1) Where a person claims monetary relief, the court may grant an
interlocutory injunction to restrain any person from disposing of, or removing
from New Brunswick, assets within New Brunswick of the person against whom
the claim is made.
(2) In considering whether to grant an injunction, the court shall take into
account the nature and substance of the claim or defence, and consider whether
there is a risk of the assets being disposed of or removed from New Brunswick.
(3) Notwithstanding Rule 40.02, an injunction may be granted under this
,subrule to remain in effect until judgment.
(4) Where an injunction has been granted under this subrule to remain in
effect until judgment and the claimant succeeds on his claim for debt or dam-
ages, the injunction shall, without further order, continue in effect until the judg-
ment is satisfied.
40.04 Unless ordered otherwise, on the granting of an interlocutory injunc-
tion or mandatory order, the plaintiff or applicant is deemed to have undertaken
to abide by any order as to damages arising therefrom.
40.05 An injunction or mandatory order may be made under this rule either
unconditionally or upon terms and conditions as may be just.242
In England, the Supreme Court Bill 243 before Parliament at the time this
paper was prepared, if enacted, would expressly authorize the granting of
Mareva type of relief. 24" In the Working Paper on The Absconding Debtors
Act 1877-1965, 245 the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, too,
specifically discussed empowering the court to hold a hearing "to make an
order restraining the respondent from removing or transferring his property
from the State. '2 46 Sections 13 and 14 of the proposed Absconding Debtors
Act would give effect to such a recommendation..2 47
2 4 2 N.B. Reg. 81-174 (O.C. 81-878). Mr. Gertner is indebted to Professor Watson
of Osgoode Hall Law School for bringing this procedural innovation to his attention.
243 Supreme Court Bill 1980-81, cl. 37. The Bill is referred to in A.J. Bekhor & Co.
v. Bilton, supra note 61.
244 Id., cl. 37.
245 Law Reform Commission of Western Aust., Working Paper on the Absconding
Debtors Act 1877-1965 (Perth, 1980).
246 Id. at 43-48.
247 Id., Appendix II. Sections 13 and 14 provide:
13(1) Subject to this Act, a person may, at any time, apply to a Judge or magis-
trate for an order restraining
(a) the transfer of any of the property of the debtor situated in the Northern
Territory; or
(b) the removal of any of the property of the debtor out of the Northern
Territory...
14(1) Upon an application made under section 13, a Julge or magistrate may
make such order as he sees fit.
(2) A magistrate or Judge shall not make an order under sub-section (1)
unless he is satisfied, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that-
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Prejudgment Remedies
The recent pace of legal developments in Ontario respecting Mareva
injunctions cries out for attention from those bodies now reviewing the Report
of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee. The new Judicature Act and
proposed Rules of Civil Procedure will be seriously defective if this aspect of
the law of prejudgment relief is not addressed. No recommendation for the
codification of the courts' Mareva injunction jurisdiction, however, would be
appropriate without an undertaking to rationalize all of the existing and
proposed prejudgment remedies.
(a) the debtor owes a debt to the applicant;
(b) the debtor has an interest in property situated in the Territory;
(c) the property-in which the debtor has an interest is about to be-
(i) transferred; or
(ii) removed from the Territory;
(d) failure to make the order would defeat, endanger or materially prejudice
the applicant's prospects of recovering the debt; and
(e) the debt-
(i) is for wages due by the debtor to the applicant; or(ii) is for an amount not less than the prescribed amount.
1981]
